Duquesne Law Review
Volume 33

Number 3

Article 5

1995

Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Death Penalty Law
Bruce Ledewitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bruce Ledewitz, Recent Developments in Pennsylvania Death Penalty Law, 33 Duq. L. Rev. 473 (1995).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol33/iss3/5

This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Recent Developments
Special Section
Recent Developments in Pennsylvania
Death Penalty Law
Bruce Ledewitz*
I. Introduction ..............................
II. Constitutional Issues .......................
III. Issues of Aggravation .......................
A. Statutory Aggravating Circumstances .......
1. Victim a Public Official ................
2. Contract Killing ......................
3. Held for Ransom .....................
4. Hijacking ...........................
5. Prosecution Witness ...................
6. In the Perpetration of a Felony ..........
7. Risk of Death to Another ...............
8. Torture-Murder ......................
9. History of Convictions for Violent
Felonies ............................
10. Prior or Concurrent Murder .............
11. Multiple Murder .....................
12. Prior Manslaughter ...................
13. Drug Related Killing or Informant
Killing .............................
14. Victims under Twelve .................
B. Non-Statutory Aggravation ...............

*

Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law.

474
476
478
478
478
479
480
480
480
481
482
483
485
487
487
488
489
489
490

474
IV.

V.

VI.
VII.

VIII.
IX.

X.
XI.
XII.
XIII.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 33:473

Issues of Mitigation ........................
A. Definition and Scope of Statutory
M itigation ............................
B. Exclusion of Mitigating
Evidence/Argument/Instruction ............
C. Assistance in Introducing
M itigation ............................
D. Unanimity in Mitigation
Findings .............................
Pre-Trial Procedure ........................
A. Notice of Aggravating
Circumstances .........................
B. Pre-Trial Challenges
to the Death Penalty ....................
C. Jury Selection .........................
Trial Issues ...............................
Issues at Sentencing ........................
A. Procedure ............................
B. Prosecution Argument
and Tactics ...........................
C. Instructions to the
Sentencing Jury ........................
D. Resentencing ..........................
Post Trial Issues ...........................
Issues on Appeal ...........................
A. What Kind of Appeal and Where? . . . . . . . . . .
B. What Issues Will Be Reviewed..............
C. Standards of Reversal in
Death Penalty Cases ....................
D. Proportionality Review ..................
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel ..............
Post Conviction Issues ......................
The Role of the Governor ....................
Epilogue .................................

492
492
494
496
497
497
497
497
498
499
501
501
502
502
505
506
507
507
508
510
511
514
516
519
520

I. INTRODUCTION
During the period from October 1992 to the end of 1994,1 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed death sentences in 34

1. This article analyzes Pennsylvania death penalty cases from October 1992
to the present, December 1, 1994. The period prior to that is covered by a series of
death penalty updates prepared by the Allegheny County Death Penalty Project. As
is usual for an article discussing recent developments, there is little discussion of
prior case law.
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direct appeal cases;2 reversed murder convictions in six direct
appeal cases' and reversed death sentences in three direct appeal cases.4 In post-conviction relief cases,' the court denied
relief in nine cases,' including one in which relief had been
granted below,7 and granted relief in one case.8 In preliminary
litigation, the court upheld death eligibility in two cases.' The
2. "Direct Appeal" refers to the review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
automatically and without review in Superior Court mandated by the death penalty
statute. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (1988) This includes direct review after a
resentencing hearing. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(h). The cases affirmed were:
Commonwealth v. Ford, 650 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Birdsong,
650 A.2d 26 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 649 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 648
A.2d 315 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Rush, 646 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Howard, 645 A.2d 1300 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Ragan, 645 A.2d 811
(Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 645 A.2d 189 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710 (Pa.
1994); Commonwealth v. Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d 1070 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth
v. Carter, 643 A.2d 61 (Pa. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. 1995); Commonwealth v. Reid, 642 A.2d 453 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 268 (1994); Commonwealth v. Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Crews, 640
A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639 A.2d 1 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 327 (1994); Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 639 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Hughes, 639 A.2d 763 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Peoples, 639 A.2d 448 (Pa.
1994); Commonwealth v. Young, 637 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Sam,
635 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2123 (1994); Commonwealth v.
Gamboa-Taylor, 634 A.2d 1106 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 634 A.2d
1078 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Meadows, 633 A.2d 1081 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Jerry Marshall, 633 A.2d 1100 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Moore, 633
A.2d 1119 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Moran, 636 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2184 (1994); Commonwealth v. Hackett, 627 A.2d 719 (Pa. 1993);
Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Conforti, 626
A.2d 129 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Reid, 626 A.2d 118 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d 716 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 615
A.2d 704 (Pa. 1992).
3. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 644 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Green, 640 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 639 A.2d 9 (Pa. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Grier, 638 A.2d 965 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638
A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v, Hawkins, 626 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1993).
4. See Commonwealth v. Antoine Williams, 650 A.2d 420 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Blount, 647 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 639 A.2d
421 (Pa. 1994).
5. Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-51 (1982 &
Supp. 1994). PCRA cases involving sentences of death are appealable only to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9546(d).
6. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 650 A.2d 863 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v
Peterkin, 649 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 645 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Cross, 634
A.2d 173 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 633 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 626 A.2d 499 (Pa.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 558 (1993); Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 620 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 703 (1994);
Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 617 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 1992).
7. See Maxwell, 626 A.2d at 500.
8. See Commonwealth v. DeHart, 650 A.2d 38 (Pa. 1994).
9. See Commonwealth v. Martorano, 634 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1993); Common-
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court also reinstated murder and other convictions in one death
penalty case, remanding for consideration of the remainder of
the defendant's post-trial motions.1" In related litigation, the
Superior Court barred death penalty eligibility in one case"
and the Commonwealth Court, in a notable decision, granted
mandamus relief directing the Governor to sign execution warrants in two death penalty cases. 2
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
It is not the purpose of this article to recount federal constitutional analysis as handed down by the United States Supreme
Court in death penalty cases during the past two years. Obviously, those pronouncements must be adopted by the Pennsylvania courts. Recounted here are only instances in which constitutional interpretations were dealt with in Pennsylvania cases, or
in which recent federal interpretation is so out-of-step with
Pennsylvania practice that some adjustment is to be anticipated.
The important example of the latter is Simmons v. South
3 in which the Court held
Carolina,"
that due process was violated by a trial court's refusal to inform a capital sentencing jury
that the defendant would be ineligible for parole under applicable state law. 4 While the precise contours of Simmons are not
clear, 5 it is likely that Pennsylvania practice concerning the
parole issue will now change. Pennsylvania was identified by
Justice Blackmun, along with Virginia and South Carolina, as
the only states with a sentencing alternative to the death penalty of life-without-parole, which refuse to so inform sentencing
juries. 6 In some cases, at least, that must now change, perhaps

wealth v. Gibbs, 626 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1993).
10. See Commonwealth v. Douglas, 645 A,2d 226 (Pa. 1994).
11. See Commonwealth v. Moose, 623 A.2d 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), allocatur
denied, 645 A.2d 1317 (Pa. 1994).
12. See Morganelli v. Casey, 646 A.2d 744 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (motion to
open peremptory judgment in mandamus denied).
13. 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
14. Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193.
15. Not only was there no opinion of the Court in Simmons, but the prosecution was described as arguing future dangerousness to the sentencing jury as a
ground for the death penalty, which would not necessarily be true in every capital
case. Justice Blackmun noted that, "[t]he State may not create a false dilemma by
advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness
while, at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never
will be released on parole." Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2198. On the other hand, it is
not clear what the Justices think "arguing future dangerousness" means. Perhaps it
happens in every case.
16. Id. at 2196 n.8.
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in all cases. Presumably, as well, relief will now be forthcoming
in a number of cases already affirmed. 7
No other death penalty decision by the United States Supreme Court affected Pennsylvania uniquely."8 Of course, cases
of general application apply in Pennsylvania as well."5
Insofar as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is concerned, no
new ground was broken on federal constitutional issues. The
court held that the weighing of aggravation and mitigation prescribed by the statute is not unconstitutional,0 that application
of a statutory amendment allowing resentencing hearings violated neither the federal nor state constitutions,2' that the older
Pennsylvania jury instructions did not unconstitutionally require
unanimity on mitigation in violation of Mills v. Maryland.' In
addition, the court rejected jury selection challenges based on
Batson v. Kentucky.' In Commonwealth v. Moore,2' the court

17. Cf Commonwealth v. Smith, 650 A.2d 863, 869 (Pa. 1994) (prosecutor told
jury that defendant could be paroled).
18. One case that may affect Pennsylvania is Tuilaepa v. California, in which
the Court upheld three statutory factors for the trier of fact to consider in death
penalty sentencing. See Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2639 (1994). One of
these factors was "Itihe age of the defendant at the time of the crime." Id. at 2637.
This factor replicates Pennsylvania mitigating circumstance (e)(4). See 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711 (e)(4). Tuilaepa may throw doubt on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
willingness to allow trial judges to restrict the reach of (e)(4) by essentially rewriting
it to read "youth or advanced age" instead of "age." See Commonwealth v. Buehl,
508 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988); Commonwealth v. Frey,
475 A.2d 700 (Pa.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984). The language of the Tuilaepa
opinion seemed to recognize that arguments on this factor could be made by both
sides "no matter how old or young" the defendant was at the time of the offense.
See Tuilaepa, 114 S. Ct. at 2639. If this reading is correct, Commonwealth v. Rivers,
in which the court upheld the refusal of the trial judge to submit to the jury the
defendant's age of 34 as a mitigating circumstance, may have been wrongly decided.
See Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710, 720 (Pa. 1994).
19. For example, in Romano v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court
held that the admission of evidence in the sentencing phase of a prior sentence of
death did not undermine the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death in the case under consideration. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 114
S. Ct. 2004, 2008-09 (1994). Pennsylvania had permitted the introduction of similar
evidence. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 479 A.2d 460, 465 (Pa. 1984); see also Delo
v. Lashley, 113 S. Ct. 1222 (1993) (upholding the refusal of a trial judge to instruct
on a mitigating circumstance - no significant criminal history - when no evidence
on the issue was introduced). The Pennsylvania statute also requires instruction only
on those circumstances as to which there is "some evidence." See 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 9711 (c)(1)(i), (ii); cf Commonwealth v. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d 716 (Pa. 1992).
20. Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d at 1077; Meadows, 633 A.2d at 1089.
21. Young, 637 A.2d at 1316-18.
22. Commonwealth v. Smith, 650 A.2d 863, 868 (Pa. 1994) (citing Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); see also Commonwealth v. Wilson, 649 A.2d 435
(Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 649 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Hackett, 627 A.2d 719 (Pa. 1993).
23, Wilson, 649 A.2d at 441 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986));
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rejected creative state constitutional arguments, including the
claim that the statute violated the separation of powers and created a special criminal tribunal. 5
III. ISSUES OF AGGRAVATION
The Pennsylvania death penalty statute provides that, at the
sentencing hearing following conviction of first degree murder,
the Commonwealth must prove at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt." Aggravating circumstances are then weighed, against any mitigating circumstances. For this reason, examination of death penalty law properly begins with an examination of these statutory aggravating
circumstances. The aggravating circumstances that may be considered are set forth in subsection (d) of section 9711.
A. Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
1. (d)(1) Victim a Public Official27
This aggravating circumstance was the subject of pre-hearing
litigation in Commonwealth v. Gibbs.' The court held that a
private security guard qualified as a "peace officer" for purposes
of (d)(1).2" The holding was based on certain provisions of The
Night Watchman's Act."0

see also Young, 637 A.2d at 1319. In Wilson and Young, the court held that the
defendant had failed to satisfy the burden of proof on raising an inference of purpoeeful racial discrimination. Wilson, 649 A.2d at 443; Young, 637 A.2d at 1319.
24. 633 A.2d 1119 (Pa. 1994).
25. Moore, 633 A.2d at 1130.
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9711(a), (c)(1).
27. Section 9711(d)(1) provides:
The victim was a fireman, peace officer, or public servant concerned in
official detention, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. §5121 (relating to escape), judge of
any court in the unified judicial system, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania,
a deputy attorney general, district attorney, assistant district attorney, member of the general assembly, governor, lieutenant governor, auditor general,
state treasurer, state law enforcement official, local law enforcement official,
federal law enforcement official or person employed to assist or assisting any
law enforcement official in the performance of his duties, who was killed in
performance of his duties or as a result of his official position.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(1).
28. 626 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1993).
29. Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 137.
30. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 3704 (1972). The Night Watchman's Act
provides that, 'all persons so appointed .
as night watchman shall have, exercise
and enjoy all the rights, powers and privileges, now vested by law in constables or
police officers." PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 3704.
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2. (d)(2) Contract Killing3
This aggravating circumstance was found or discussed in five
cases." In Gibbs, the court held in a presentencing proceeding
that the victim of the homicide must be the object of the contract
to kill in order for (d)(2) to apply."3 In that case, the contract
was arguably for the death of one person, but a different person
was actually killed.' On the other hand, in Commonwealth v.
Hackett,35 and Commonwealth v. Spence, 6 the court sustained
the finding of (d)(2) by holding that the original "contract" included the possibility of killing others.37
In Commonwealth v. Mayhue,3 s the court decided the effect
on (d)(2) if the original contract for killing is not carried out and
someone else, or the defendant himself, then commits the killing.39 Prior to this decision, the issue had only been discussed
in dictum in Hackett" and Spence.4 The court's dictum suggested that (d)(2) might still apply, to which Justice Cappy had
objected in concurrence in Hackett." In Mayhue, the court
unanimously adopted Justice Cappy's position and reversed the
finding of (d)(2) because none of the individuals contracted with
fulfilled the contract by killing the defendant's wife.43 Instead,
the defendant committed the murder."

31. Section 9711(d)(2) provides that, "[tihe defendant paid or was paid by
another person or had contracted to pay or be paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of the victim." 42 PA.
CONS. STAT, § 9711(d)(2).
32. See Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 639 A.2d 421, 439-40 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Moran, 636 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2184 (1994);
Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176, 1184-85 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Hackett, 627 A.2d 719, 726-27 (Pa. 1993); Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 138.
33. Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 138.
34. Id.
35. 627 A.2d 719 (Pa. 1993).
36. 627 A.2d 1176 (Pa. 1993).
37. See Spence, 627 A.2d at 1185; Hackett, 627 A.2d at 727.
38. 639 A.2d 421 (Pa. 1994).
39. Mayhue, 639 A.2d at 438-39.
40. Hackett, 627 A.2d at 727 n.8.
41. Spence, 627 A.2d at 1184 n.9.
42. Hackett, 627 A.2d at 727 (Cappy, J., concurring).
43. Mayhue, 639 A.2d at 439.
44. Id. at 440. Further, the court's decision in Moran established, though there
had not been any reason to doubt it, that (d)(2) could be proved by circumstantial
evidence of, for example, an unexplained increase in income following a killing.
Moran, 636 A.2d at 615. Moran is worth noting, however, because the Commonwealth, in an attempt to gain the defendant's cooperation in other cases, joined the
defendant's unsuccessful attempt to reverse the sentence. See Moran, 636 A.2d at
613.
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3. (d)(3) Held for Ransom

This circumstance was found in Commonwealth v. Daniels."'
In Daniels, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's finding because, even though the defendant
ultimately abandoned the plan without asking for ransom, the
victim was still held for that purpose for a period of time.7
4. (d)(4) Hijacking"

This circumstance was not found in any cases considered by
the Pennsylvania courts during this period.
5. (d)(5) Prosecution Witness49
This aggravating circumstance was found in two cases." In
both cases there was direct evidence that the killing was motivated by a desire to prevent the victim from testifying.5 Therefore, the court's prior ruling that circumstantial evidence was
insufficient to establish (d)(5) was not at issue. 2

45. Section 9711(d)(3) provides that, "[t]he victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
9711(d)(3).
46. 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994).
47. Daniels, 644 A.2d at 1179-80.
48. Section 9711(d)(4) provides that, "[t]he death of the victim occurred while
defendant was engaged in the hijacking of an aircraft." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
971 1(d)(4).
49. Section 9711(d)(5) provides that, "Itihe victim was a prosecution witness to
a murder or other felony committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose
of preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury or criminal
proceeding involving such defenses." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(5).
50. See Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994).
51. Daniels, 644 A.2d at 1179; Kindler, 639 A.2d at 7.
52. See Commonwealth v. Crawley, 526 A.2d 334, 345 (Pa. 1987) (holding that
evidence that victim witnessed a felony and was killed by defendant insufficient to
establish (d)(5)).
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6. (d)(6) In the Perpetrationof a Felony53
This aggravating circumstance was found or discussed in
twenty-two cases during this period. 4 In most of these cases,
the application of (d)(6) was straightforward. Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Kenneth Williams,55 the court held that defense
counsel had not been ineffective despite essentially conceding
that the jury's verdict of homicide and robbery determined the
presence of (d)(6).56 In another case, Commonwealth v. Thompson,57 the trial judge charged the jury to the same effect."8
The issues that did arise with regard to (d)(6) concerned either procedural matters 9 or concerned the scope of the circumstance. In terms of scope, Commonwealth v. Edmiston' held
that the predicate felony could occur prior to the homicide "as
long as the killing occurred so close in time and space to the
felony that it could be considered part of the felony."'
Edmiston also clarified the felony-as-means-of-death issue. In
several cases, defendants argued that where the commission of
the felony itself was the means for the killing, that felony should

53. Section 9711(d)(6) provides that, "[tihe defendant committed a killing while
in the perpetration of a felony." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(6).
54. Commonwealth v. Smith, 650 A.2d 863, 866 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Ford, 650 A.2d 433, 436 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Antoine Williams, 650 A.2d
420, 423 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 648 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Rush, 646 A.2d 557, 564 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 645
A.2d 189, 198 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175, 1178 (Pa. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Rivers, 644 A.2d 710, 712 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Kenneth
Williams, 640 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Crews, 640 A.2d 395,
397 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 639 A.2d 763, 765-66 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Peoples, 639 A.2d 448, 449 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639
A.2d 1, 7 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 327 (1994); Commonwealth v. Young, 637
A.2d 1313, 1320 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1389 (1994); Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 634 A.2d 1078, 1090 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Moore, 633 A.2d 1119,
1123 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 908 (1994); Commonwealth v. Meadows, 633
A.2d 1081, 1083 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 626 A.2d 499, 500 (Pa.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 558 (1994); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 626 A.2d 133,
135 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Conforti, 626 A.2d 129, 132 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 620 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 703
(1994); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 615 A.2d 704, 713 (Pa. 1992).
55. 640 A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1994).
56. Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1266.
57. 648 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1994).
58. See Thompson, 648 A.2d at 320.
59. See notes 231-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of procedural
matters.
60. 634 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 1993).
61. Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1091 (citing Commonwealth v. Yarris, 549 A.2d 513
(Pa. 1988)).
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not be considered within (d)(6)."' The court rejected these
claims.' Edmiston, in rejecting a vagueness challenge to (d)(6),
pointed out that aggravated assault, which could not serve as a
predicate to (d)(6), was a "lesser included offense" of murder.'"
Thus, the familiar structure of lesser included offenses defines
which felonies qualify as (d)(6) predicate felonies and which
felonies are excluded.
7. (d)(7) Risk of Death to Another"5
This circumstance was found or discussed in eleven cases. 66
In most of these cases, (d)(7) clearly applied. 7 Of the eleven,
only Commonwealth v. Stokes' discussed the substantive elements of (d)(7). In Stokes, the defendant fired three shots into a
walk-in refrigerator where he was holding four people.69 Two of
the four were killed.70 The defendant also shot and killed a
third victim, who witnessed the murders and attempted to
flee. 7
The court in Stokes reversed the jury's finding of (d)(7) in each
of the three informations.7 The trial judge had instructed the
jury that "as a matter of logic, the deaths of the other two victims would be an aggravating circumstance."7 ' The court in
Stokes asserted that the jury instruction was in error for two
reasons. First, the trial judge essentially directed a finding of
the aggravating circumstance.74 Apparently, a trial judge may
62. See, e.g., Pierce, 645 A.2d at 198; Jermyn, 620 A.2d at 1132.
63. Pierce, 645 A.2d at 198 (arson); Jermyn, 620 A.2d at 1132 (arson endangering persons); cf Kindler, 639 A.2d at 7 (kidnapping).
64. Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1090.
65. Section 9711(d)(7) provides that, "[iln the commission of the offense the
defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to
the victim of the offense." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(7).
66. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 649 A.2d 435, 452 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Douglas, 645 A.2d 226, 228 (Pa. 1994); Pierce, 645 A.2d at 198; Crews, 640 A.2d at
397; Young, 637 A.2d at 1320; Commonwealth v. Sam, 635 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2123 (1994); Moore, 633 A.2d at 1123; Meadows, 633 A.2d at
1083; Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176, 1180 (Pa. 1993); Gibbs, 626 A.2d at
135; Stokes, 615 A.2d at 713.
67. See, e.g., Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 135 (defendant fired a shot "missing the husband but killing the other man").
68. 615 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1992).
69. Stokes, 615 A.2d at 708.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 714. The sentences of death were affirmed, however, because no
mitigating circumstances were found. Id. Thus, death remained the mandatory verdict. Id. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(1)(iv).
73. Stokes, 615 A.2d at 713.
74. Id.
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not invade the discretion of the jury in this way. But the court
also stated, as an independent ground of reversal, that the instructions "misstated the intent" of (d)(7).75 The jury could not
have found a grave risk of death to the two victims in the walkin refrigerator, but only to the two who survived.76 Also, there
was no risk of death when the third victim was shot and killed
because he was alone.77
Two conclusions may be drawn about (d)(7). First, the act of
shooting itself does not always create a grave risk of death to
another person. Obviously, it was possible in Stokes that a stray
bullet might have left the building, wounding a passer-by. Such
speculative possibilities apparently are insufficient to establish
(d)(7). Second, a homicide victim cannot be "another person" for
purposes of (d)(7). When two or more persons are killed, although other aggravating circumstances will apply,7" unless
survivors are also present, (d)(7) cannot be found.
Although this analysis is a fair reading of Stokes, it is inconsistent with the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Crews,79
in which two hikers who were alone were killed in an overnight
shelter and (d)(7) was found." There was no discussion of the
(d)(7) issue in the opinion. The difference between Crews and
Stokes could possibly be that one victim in Crews was killed
later than the other victim.81 On the other hand, the difference
might only have been that the defendant in Crews did not raise
the (d)(7) issue and the court overlooked it.
8. (d)(8) Torture-Murder2
This aggravating circumstance was found or discussed in nine
cases." The application of this aggravating circumstance probably comes closer to unconstitutional vagueness than do any of
75.

Id.

76. Id.
77. Id. at 713-14.

78. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(11). Section (d)(11) provides, that
"[the defendant has been convicted of another murder, committed either before or at
the time of the offense at issue." Id.
79. 640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994)
80. Crews, 640 A.2d at 396-97.
81. See Crews, 640 A.2d at 397.
82. Section 9711(d)(8) provides that "[t]he offense was committed by means of
torture." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(8).
83. See Ford, 650 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1994); Antoine Williams, 650 A.2d at 423;
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 645 A.2d 199, 200 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 742 (1994);
Daniels, 644 A.2d at 1178; Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1262-63; Crews, 640 A.2d
at 397; Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 639 A.2d 786, 791 (Pa. 1994); Peoples, 639 A.2d at
449; Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1090.
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the other statutory aggravating circumstances. The court has attempted to avoid this vagueness problem by giving a more concise definition to torture. For example, in Commonwealth v.
Edmiston," the court stated that torture "is the intentional infliction of a considerable amount of pain and suffering on a victim which is unnecessarily heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity" and that "[tihere must be an indication that the killer was not satisfied with killing alone."" There
must be an additional, specific intent to inflict pain, beyond an
intent to kill.8 As held in Edmiston, these words are not formulaic as long as their sense was communicated to the jury. 87
Clearly, the rule is now that some instruction must be given." In Commonwealth v. Fahy,89 however, the court held that
relief would not be granted in Post Conviction Relief Act
("PCRA") litigation 0 for failure of counsel to request such instruction in cases prior to the court's holding that it was required. 1 The court's analysis in Fahy was quite fact specific,
however, and in a closer case, perhaps the court would look at
the issue differently.
The parameters of torture in (d)(8) are not clear. In some
cases, the court's discussion gives an indirect explanation of why
the defendant's behavior could be considered torture.92 In other
cases, however, findings of (d)(8) have been upheld, sometimes
without specific challenge by the defendant, in situations that
appear to amount to brutal beatings and stabbings, but seemingly not to torture. 3 It is not clear what aspects of these cases
are defining torture.
The only explanation by the court of what specific behavior
constitutes torture was given in Commonwealth v. Kenneth Williams.9' In Kenneth Williams, the court held that it had been

84. 634 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 1993).
85. Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1091 (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d
699, 709 (Pa. 1989) and Commonwealth v. Nelson, 523 A.2d 728, 737 (Pa.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 928 (1987)).
86. Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1091.
87. Id.
88. See Nelson, 523 A.2d at 737-38 (counsel ineffective for failing to object to
absence of definition of torture).
89. 645 A.2d 199 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 742 (1994).
90. Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-51 (1982 & Supp.
1994).
91. Fahy, 645 A.2d at 203-04.
92. See, e.g., Daniels, 644 A.2d at 1180 (long ordeal); Jacobs, 639 A.2d at 792
(shallow wounds).
93. See Ford, 650 A.2d at 437; Crews, 640 A.2d at 397; Peoples, 639 A.2d at
450.
94. 640 A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1994).
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error, although harmless, to submit (d)(8) to the jury. 5 A forensic pathologist had testified that "the victim, on being shot, suffered extreme pain and eventually experienced a sense of impending doom."96 This was insufficient to submit (d)(8) to the
jury." The ferocity of stabbings by itself would also be insufficient.9 8 Absent evidence that such an attack was prolonged purposely, multiple stab wounds would seem to amount simply to
the method by which death was brought about.
9. (d)(9) History of Convictions for Violent Felonies"
This aggravating circumstance was found or discussed in
thirteen cases during this period." ° In several cases, (d)(9) was
not analyzed beyond the court's noting that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the finding by the sentencing jury."'
A few issues of interpretation did arise, however. The court
held in three cases that crimes occurring subsequently to the
murder at issue could be considered part of a defendant's "history" for purposes of (d)(9). 2 The court rejected the argument
that there could be no "significant history" unless the crimes
committed by the defendant were similar in some way to the
murder."°3 The court reiterated that a single prior conviction
could not satisfy (d)(9).1 4 The court held that, in the case of a
conviction from another state, the term "felony" in (d)(9) referred
to the definition of felony under local law, rather than to an
analogy to Pennsylvania law.' °5 The court also held that con95. Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1263. The jury did not return a (d)(8) finding. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Section 9711(d)(9) provides that, "[tlhe defendant has a significant history
of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person." 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(9).
100. Smith, 650 A.2d at 866; Antoine Williams, 650 A.2d at 423; Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 650 A.2d 26, 28 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 649 A.2d
435, 445-46 (Pa. 1994); Rush, 646 A.2d at 564; Commonwealth v. Howard, 645 A.2d
1300, 1303 (Pa. 1993); Douglas, 645 A.2d at 228; Rivers, 644 A.2d at 712; Commonwealth v. Reid, 642 A.2d 453, 458 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 268 (1994) [hereinafter Reid I1];
Young, 637 A.2d at 1320; Commonwealth v. Moran, 636 A.2d 612, 613
(Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2184 (1994); Maxwell, 626 A.2d at 500; Commonwealth v. Reid, 626 A.2d 118, 120 (Pa. 1993) [hereinafter Reid I].
101. See Birdsong, 650 A.2d at 28; Wilson, 649 A.2d at 445-46 Rush, 646 A.2d
at 560-61; Howard, 645 A.2d at 1303.
102. Reid II, 642 A.2d at 458-59; Young, 637 A.2d at 1321; Reid I, 626 A.2d at
122.
103. Young, 637 A.2d at 1321.
104. Moran, 636 A.2d at 613 n.1.
105. Maxwell, 626 A.2d at 501-02 n.4. The holding in Maxwell is not entirely

486
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spiracy to commit murder was a violent felony under (d)(9) even
if there was no murder conviction."' 6 Possession of a 10 7loaded
weapon was also held to be a violent felony under (d)(9).
The court also dealt with issues of procedure under (d)(9),
specifically the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions and
the consequences of error. The court held that at least some
details of the prior conviction were admissible and not just the
Perhaps more controversial was the
fact of conviction itself.'
court's related holding that the sentence for0 9 the prior convictions, even if death, could also be introduced.
In a few cases, the court dealt with the issue of the consequences of error at trial in proving (d)(9). In Commonwealth v.
Moran"' and Commonwealth v. Smith,"' sentences of death
were affirmed, despite erroneous findings of (d)(9) by the jury,
because in the absence of any mitigating circumstances, and in
the presence of other aggravating circumstances, the statute
mandated the death penalty."' In Commonwealth v. Reid,"'
the court held that it was error to admit evidence of a charge
that was later withdrawn, but that the (d)(9) finding would not
be reversed because the murder conviction arising out of the
same evidence "overshadowed" the error."' On the other hand,
in Commonwealth v. Antoine Williams,"5 the court strictly construed Rule 352 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure to require notice of aggravating circumstances the Commonwealth intended to use."' The court held that because re-

clear, since the court also held that this claim had been previously litigated and
that the crime at issue might not be a misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law. Id. at
500.
106. Reid I, 626 A.2d at 122.
107. Maxwell, 626 A.2d at 501 n.4. The court also would have so held in reference to burglary in Rivers, but the trial court excluded the conviction. See Rivers,
644 A.2d at 720.
108. Rivers, 644 A.2d at 720; Young, 637 A.2d at 1321; Reid 1, 626 A.2d at
122.
109. See Reid II, 642 A.2d at 458-59.
110. 636 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2184 (1994).
111. 650 A.2d 863 (Pa. 1994).
112. Smith, 650 A.2d at 866 (mistaken conviction listed); Moran, 636 A.2d at
614 (single conviction).
113. 626 A.2d 118 (Pa. 1993).
114. Reid 1, 626 A.2d at 122.
115. 650 A.2d 420 (Pa. 1994).
116. Antoine Williams, 650 A.2d at 429. Rule 352 provides:
The Commonwealth shall notify the defendant in writing of any aggravating
circumstances which the Commonwealth intends to submit at the sentencing
hearing. Notice shall be given at or before the time of arraignment, unless the
attorney for the Commonwealth becomes aware of the existence of an aggravating circumstance after arraignment or the time for notice is extended by
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cords of convictions were "always available" to the prosecution,
no late notice under the rule would be permitted."' The death
sentence in Antoine Williams was reversed and the case was
remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which (d)(9) evidence
was inadmissible. 118
10. (d)(1O) Prioror ConcurrentMurder"'
This aggravating circumstance was found in three cases: Commonwealth v. Sam,' Commonwealth v. Peoples, 2' and Commonwealth v. Ragan. 2 In Peoples and Ragan, each defendant
had been convicted of a prior, unrelated murder." In Sam,
more than one murder occurred. 24 In all three cases, (d)(11)
would have been equally applicable; so these cases presumably
show that in a situation in which a defendant has been convicted of a murder for which a life sentence may be imposed, the
prosecution must choose between (d)(10) and (d)(11).
11. (d)(11) Multiple Murder

12

This aggravating circumstance was found in five cases, all of
which involved multiple murders." 6 In fact, though the language of (d)(11) would reach prior, unrelated murders, the court

the court for cause shown.
PA. R. CmM. P. 352.
117. Antoine Williams, 650 A.2d at 429-30.
118. Id. at 430. Inexplicably, the court in Antoine Williams failed to cite or
discuss Crews, decided a few months before, in which non-compliance with Rule 352
was held to be harmless. See Crews, 640 A.2d at 404. The cases can be distinguished because in Crews there was "constructive notice." Id. at 403. Nevertheless,
the approaches to Rule 352 in the two cases seem completely different.
119. Section 9711(d)(10) provides as follows:
The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence
of life imprisonment or death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing
a sentence of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission
of the offense.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(10).
120. 635 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2123 (1994).
121. 639 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994).
122. 645 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1994).
123. Ragan, 645 A.2d at 817; Peoples, 639 A.2d at 449.
124. Sam, 635 A.2d at 604-05.
125. Section 9711(d)(11) provides that, "[t]he defendant has been convicted of
another murder, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue." 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(11).
126. Birdsong, 650 A.2d at 28; Crews, 640 A.2d at 397; Jacobs, 639 A.2d at
791; Hughes, 639 A.2d at 765-66; Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 634 A.2d 1106,
1108 (Pa. 1993).
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even referred to it as a "double homicide" circumstance. 27 In
either situation, that of a prior murder or a concurrent one,
there is no difference between (d)(11) and (d)(10) as long as a life
sentence could have been imposed for the prior murder.128
There are distinctions, however, between both (d)(10) and
(d)(11) on the one hand, and (d)(9) on the other. First, a single
murder conviction cannot establish (d)(9), which requires a "significant history of felony convictions."'29 Second, (d)(10) and
(d)(11) specifically exclude consideration of offenses committed
subsequently to the murder for which the defendant is being
13
sentenced.1 0 The court declined in Commonwealth v. Reid
to imply a similar restriction for (d)(9). 3' Thus, a defendant
who commits a simple killing after the murder at issue will not,
by that fact alone, be eligible for the death penalty in the first
case.
33
12. (d)(12) PriorManslaughter'

This aggravating circumstance was found in Commonwealth v.
Brown.' In Brown, the earlier conviction occurred in 1967,
but the court did not consider any issue of possible staleness. 35 The court also held, as it did under other record aggravating circumstances," 637 that the circumstances of the prior
crime were admissible."

127. Crews, 640 A.2d at 403.
128. See, e.g., Sam, 635 A.2d at 612 n.1. (defining (d)(10) as "the commission of
multiple homicides").
129. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(9) (emphasis added).
130. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9711(d)(10), (d)(11).
131. 642 A.2d 453 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 268 (1994).
132. Reid II, 642 A.2d at 459 n.8.
133. Section 9711(d)(12) provides that, "(tihe defendant has been convicted of
voluntary manslaughter, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. §2503 (relating to voluntary manslaughter), committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue." 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(12).
134. 648 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1994).
135. Brown, 648 A.2d at 1185.
136. See Rivers, 644 A.2d at 720; Young, 637 A.2d at 1321; Reid 1, 626 A.2d at
122.
137. Brown, 648 A.2d at 1185.
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13. (d)(13) - (d)(15) Drug Related
Killing or
3
Informant Killing1
None of these three circumstances was found in any cases
decided during this period.
14. (d)(16) Victims under Twelve.

9

This aggravating circumstance was found in Commonwealth v.
Gamboa-Taylor." ' In Gamboa-Taylor, however, there was no
discussion of the circumstance beyond the court's holding that
there was ample evidence establishing the age of the victims."" The (d)(16) circumstance was also mentioned in Commonwealth v. Sam,"" in which the court agreed with the defendant that (d)(16) could not apply because it had been enacted
after the instant murders."" This non-retroactivity observation
138. Section 9711(d)(13) provides:
The defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice in the killing, as
defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c) (relating to liability for conduct of another;
complicity), while in the perpetration of a felony under the provisions of the
act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance,
Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and punishable under the provisions of 18
Pa.C.S. § 7508 (relating to drug trafficking sentencing and penalties).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(13).
Section 9711(d)(14) provides:
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or
in competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or
delivery of any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar
law of any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States, and the
defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined
in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing resulted from or was related to that
association, involvement or competition to promote the defendant's activities in
selling, manufacturing, distributing or delivering controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(14).
Section 9711(d)(15) provides:
At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental
informant or had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or
police agency with information concerning criminal activity and the defendant
committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18
Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing was in retaliation for the victim's activities as
a nongovernmental informant or in providing information concerning criminal
activity to an investigative, law enforcement or police agency.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(dX15).
139. Section 9711(d)(16) provides that, "[tihe victim was a child under 12 years
of age." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d)(16).
140. 634 A.2d 1106 (Pa. 1993).
141. See Gamboa-Taylor, 634 A.2d at 1108-09.
142. 635 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2123 (1994).
143. Sam, 635 A.2d at 612. The court held, however, that (d)(16) had not been
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would presumably apply to any other amendment of an aggravating circumstance.
B. Non-Statutory Aggravation
If one were to look only at the language of the statute, it
would appear that non-statutory aggravation - i.e., evidence of
aggravation not admitted pursuant to any of the sixteen aggravating circumstances - could not be an issue. The statute specifically provides that the death penalty is to be decided upon
with reference only to aggravating and mitigating circumstances'4 and that aggravating circumstances "shall be limited" to
the statutory list.' 5 Therefore, there simply is no non-statutory aggravation in Pennsylvania.
Nevertheless, the court has allowed what might be termed
non-statutory aggravation in argument, for rebuttal and through
evidence at the guilt phase of the trial. In this period, the court
allowed prosecutorial argument at sentencing with regard to the
defendant's lack of remorse in Commonwealth v. Thompson.'"
The court also allowed prosecutorial argument about the future
dangerousness of the defendant in Commonwealth v. Peoples47
and Commonwealth v. Kenneth Williams." The court was unclear in Williams about whether the argument was proper or
harmless error. 49 In Peoples, the argument was clearly viewed
as proper." The court did not explain how the jury was to use
these arguments since the statute precludes reliance on anything but statutory aggravation. The court did not, however,
permit the admission of non-statutory aggravating evidence in
these cases.''
The second way non-statutory aggravation is introduced is by
way of what the court calls rebuttal to defense evidence argument. In theory, this is perfectly straightforward. If, for example, the defense introduces evidence that the defendant was

found by the trial judge. Id.
144. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(iv).
145. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(d).
146. 648 A.2d 315, 322-23 (Pa. 1994).
147. 639 A.2d 448, 451 (Pa. 1994) ("stop him").
148. 640 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Pa. 1994) (Death penalty "will deter" defendant from
ever again shooting someone.).
149. Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1262.
150. Peoples, 639 A.2d at 452 ("The importance of this comparison in his argument was that there exists a mechanism to correct the problem, and in this instance
the only way to prevent the appellant from killing again was to impose the death
penalty.,").
151. Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1262; Peoples, 639 A.2d at 452.
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fifteen years old at the time of the murder, and the prosecution
has evidence that the defendant in fact was eighteen, that evidence would be admissible.
The court mentioned such rebuttal in four cases. In Commonwealth v. Thompson,"2 the court permitted general reflections
on the defendant's character in rebuttal of the defense's mitigation.'53 In Commonwealth v. Ford,14 the court allowed crossexamination of the length of time the defendant had spent in jail
to rebut the defense's implication that the defendant "would be
5
amenable to rehabilitation." ' In Commonwealth v. Young,'5
the court permitted evidence relating to the murder scene, to
cast doubt on the defense claim that at the time of the murders
appellant could "not fully appreciate the criminality of his actions."' In Commonwealth v. Ragan,55 the court permitted
evidence that other family members had been charged with
crimes "in response to the assertions of appellant's mother on
direct examination that appellant had been'a warm and loving
son whose childhood had been one of playful innocence. " "'
The final way that non-statutory aggravation influences sentencing is by admission at the trial on guilt. Typically, all of the
guilt phase evidence is admitted at sentencing, and in some way
referred to by the trial judge: In Commonwealth v. Reid,"ce the
court upheld the admission of the defendant's association with
the Junior Black Mafia and the nature of that group.' 6 ' Although the court held that such evidence was admissible at the
trial on guilt, no limiting instructions were required at the sentencing phase to avoid prejudice to the defendant.6 2 In this
way arguably proper evidence admitted at the guilt phase can
amount to non-statutory aggravation at sentencing.

152. 648 A.2d 315 (Pa. 1994).
153. Thompson, 648 A.2d at 323.
154. 650 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1994).
155. Ford, 650 A.2d at 442. It is not c]ear from the opinion why such evidence
would not have been admissible as statutory aggravation.
156. 637 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993).
157. Young, 637 A.2d at 1323.
158. 645 A.2d 811 (Pa. 1994).
159. Ragan, 645 A.2d at 822. Obviously, the court erred in Ragan, since the
evidence in rebuttal did not at all relate to the defendant's character and no doubt
seriously prejudiced the jury against the defendant's family. It is surely in no sense
either proper aggravation or proper rebuttal that a defendant's youth was one of
.constant exposure to violence."
160. 642 A.2d 453 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 268 (1994).
161. Reid 11, 642 A.2d at 461.
162. Id.
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IV. ISSUES OF MITIGATION
A. Definition and Scope of Statutory Mitigation
The structure of mitigation under the statute appears to parallel that of aggravation. There are statutory mitigating circumstances listed and, apparently, only they may be taken into
account in sentencing. On the other hand, circumstance (e)(8) is
so broad" - as constitutionally it must be'" - that the
statutory formula does not function as much of a limit.' s Thus,
issues of definition and scope do not arise in court opinions in
the same way that they do in the realm of aggravating circumstances. Nor does the Pennsylvania Supreme Court generally
review findings of mitigation, since an error in such a finding
would not be reversible.'6 6
Some mitigating circumstance findings are discussed or noted
in the opinions, though for the reasons mentioned above, the
listing is not likely to be complete. Mitigating circumstance
(e)(1)" 7 was found or discussed in six cases.'" The only issue
concerning (e)(1) was raised in Commonwealth v. Stokes, 9 in
which the court stated that just as juvenile convictions are admissible for purposes of aggravation, they may be introduced to
aid the jury in determining mitigation. 79
Mitigating circumstance (e)(2)" was found or discussed in
five cases.1 12 There were no significant issues raised in these
cases about this circumstance.

163. Section 9711(e)(8) provides that, "[ainy other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(8).
164. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that the death penalty statute must allow consideration as mitigation any aspect of the defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense).

165.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d 716, 723 (Pa. 1992)

(evidence excluded by modifiers in (e)(2) or (eX5) "can always be considered under
sub-section (e)(8)").

166.
167.

See, e.g., Hughes, 639 A.2d at 774.
Section 9711(e)(1) provides that, "[tihe defendant has no significant history

of prior criminal convictions." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(1).

168. Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177, 1188 (Pa. 1994); Pierce, 645 A.2d
at 198; Hughes, 639 A.2d at 766 n.2; Gamboa.Taylor, 634 A.2d at 1109; Commonwealth v. Conforti, 626 A.2d 129, 132 (Pa. 1993); Stokes, 615 A.2d at 714.
169. 615 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1992).
170. Stokes, 615 A.2d at 714.
171. Section 9711(e)(2) provides that, "Ithe defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(2).
172. Brown, 648 A.2d at 1188; Hughes, 639 A.2d at 773-74; Jacobs, 639 A.2d at
791; Young, 637 A.2d at 1316 n.3; Craig Williams, 615 A.2d at 723. In addition, the
court held in Wilson, that counsel was not ineffective for failing to request in-

structions on (e)(2). Wilson, 649 A.2d at 450.
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Circumstance (e)(3),"7 3 and its relationship to findings of
(e)(2) and of guilty but mentally ill,17 4 were discussed in Com-

monwealth v. Hughes.'75 In Hughes, the trial judge found (e)(2)
but failed to find the defendant guilty but mentally ill; nor did
the judge find the presence of (e)(3). 17 6 The court in Hughes asserted that in a capital case, evidence tending to establish
guilty-but-mentally-ill, as opposed to evidence of insanity, for
example, was admissible only at the penalty phase. 1 7 The
court did not refuse to review the failure to find (e)(3) but held
that the trial judge
had not erred in distinguishing between
178
(e)(2) and (e)(3).

Circumstance (e)(4).7 was found or discussed in Hughes'"
and Commonwealth v. Rivers.'' In Rivers, the court upheld
the trial judge's refusal to charge the jury on (e)(4) because the
defendant was 34 at the time of the killing."2 Essentially, this
age was held to be not mitigating."
The court discussed (e)(5)'" in Commonwealth v. Craig Wil5 in upholding the action of the trial judge in instructliams,"'
ing that there was no evidence in that case of substantial domi-7
nation. 8' The court also held in Commonwealth v. Wilson1
that counsel was not ineffective for failing to request instruction
on (e)(5)."
Circumstances (e)(6)'
and (e)(7)'
apparently were not
173. Section 9711(e)(3) provides that, "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law was substantially impaired." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(3).
174. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314 (1983).
175. 639 A.2d 763, 774 (Pa. 1993).
176. Hughes, 639 A.2d at 774.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Section 9711(e)(4) provides that, "[t]he age of the defendant at the time of
the crime." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(4).
180. Hughes, 639 A.2d at 766 n.2.
181. 644 A.2d 710, 720 (Pa. 1994).
182. Rivers, 644 A.2d at 720. See note 18 for a discussion of age as a mitigating circumstance.
183. Id.
184. Section 9711(e)(5) provides that, "[tihe defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution under 18
Pa.C.S. §309 (relating to duress), or acted under the substantial domination of another person." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(5).
185. 615 A.2d 716 (Pa. 1992).
186. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d at 727 n.8.
187. 649 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1994).
188. Wilson, 649 A.2d at 449-50.
189. Section 9711(e)(6) provides that, "[t]he victim was a participant in the
defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal acts." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 9711(e)(6).
190. Section 9711(e)(7) provides that, "Ift]he defendant's participation in the
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found in any cases decided during this period. Circumstance
(e)(8)"' was found or discussed in eight cases."
A very broad range of factors may be considered under (e)(8).
For example, in Commonwealth v. Conforti,9 3 physical disability could be considered, and in Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor
remorse was considered.' The court made clear in Craig Williams, that any mitigation excluded by the precise terms of mitigating circumstances (e)(1) through (e)(7) 9' could be considered under (e)(8)."9 ' On the other hand, even though admissible, insufficient evidence simply could not convince factfinders to
return an (e)(8) finding.'9 7 Nor are general arguments against
the death penalty permitted under (e)(8). 9 '
B. Exclusion of MitigatingEvidence /Argument/Instruction
The general rule about mitigation is that everything is admitted into evidence, everything is argued and everything is instructed. It is likely that any broad restriction on mitigation
would be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, during this period, the
court did recognize some limits with regard to mitigation. Of
course, some aspects of these rulings may well ultimately be
reversed, either in the particular case, or in other cases.
In several cases, the court upheld exclusions from evidence at
the sentencing hearing, which is the most problematic exclusion. 99 In Commonwealth v. Young,"' the court upheld the
exclusion of letters written by the defendant because, when the
defendant did not testify, the letters would amount to allocution
- an unsworn statement without cross-examination.20 ' In

homicidal act was relatively minor." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(7).
191. Section 9711(e)(8) provides that, "[any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(8).
192. Thompson, 648 A.2d at 318; Rush, 646 A.2d at 564 n.1; Daniels, 644 A.2d
at 1183; Jacobs, 639 A.2d at 791; Hughes, 639 A.2d at 774-75; Gamboa.Taylor, 634
A.2d at 1109; Conforti, 626 A.2d at 132; Craig Williams, 615 A.2d at 723.
193. 626 A.2d 129 (Pa. 1993).
194. 634 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Pa. 1993); Conforti, 626 A.2d at 132.
195. For example, an "impairment" under (e)(3) that is not "substantialD". See
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(e)(3).
196. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d at 723-24.
197. See, e.g., Rush, 646 A.2d at 564 n.1; Hughes, 639 A.2d at 774-75.
198. See Daniels, 644 A.2d at 1183.
199. After all, once the information is in evidence, argument and instruction,
while helpful, are not necessary for the fact-finder to give the evidence appropriate
consideration.
200. 637 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993).
201. Young, 637 A.2d at 1322.
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Commonwealth v. Stokes, 2 ' the court upheld the exclusion
from evidence of the defendant's continuing assertion that he
was innocent of the murder. 3 On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Wilson,2 '" the defendant's sentencing strategy was to
continue to deny guilt and the defendant was permitted to testify to that effect."5 In Commonwealth v. Reid," the court
upheld, though in language suggesting harmless error, the exclusion of"2references
to the defendant's conversion to the "Mus07
lim faith.
The court also upheld a trial court's exclusion of defense counsel argument relating to religious objections to the death
penalty."8 In Commonwealth v. Daniels,' 9 evidence of a religious objection was said not to relate to the character of the
defendant.21
The court upheld three trial-court refusals to instruct at sentencing, but in each case, the matter was before the jury and
consideration was not excluded by instruction. In Commonwealth v. Peoples,21' the court failed to instruct that adjustment to prison was a mitigating circumstance.212 In Commonwealth v. Young,"' the court upheld a refusal to charge that
the jury could render a life sentence on any basis.' Both of
these approaches to mitigation were assumed to be reachable
through (e)(8). In Commonwealth v. Rivers,"5 the court seemed
to go further in excluding the submission of (e)(4) to the jury
because the defendant's age of thirty-four at the time of the
crime was not mitigating. 1 '

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

615 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1992).
Stokes, 615 A.2d at 715.
649 A.2d 435 (Pa. 1994).
Wilson, 649 A.2d at 450.
642 A.2d 453 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 268 (1994).
Reid II, 642 Ak2d at 459-60. The Reid H ruling is difficult to justify.
See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 644 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa. 1994).
644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994).
Id. at 1183.
639 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994).
Peoples, 639 A.2d at 452.
637 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993).
Young, 637 A.2d at 1322.
644 A.2d 710 (Pa. 1994).
Rivers, 644 A.2d at 719-20.
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C. Assistance in Introducing Mitigation
The court indirectly raised the issue in Reid II whether a
defendant has the right to utilize a defense psychologist at government expense as a mitigation specialist.217 In that case, the
court rejected the claim that the defendant had the right to
county funds to utilize a particular psychologist. 18 The court
pointed out that the defendant was offered other psychologists
"for purposes of mitigation."219 One of the psychologists offered
would have been a court-appointed psychiatrist, but it is not
clear that the others referred to would have been.20
The court also held in Commonwealth v. Sam 1 that a defense attorney will not be deemed ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of mitigating circumstances when the defendant
specifically so directs."' In Sam, the court noted that the defendant "knowingly and intelligently, and with full exploration
and understanding of the consequences, waived his right to have
mitigating evidence argued. "us According to the court, "an extensive colloquy" was held to establish this waiver, including the
mitigating circumstances counsel would have presented." 4
While the decision in Sam establishes that the attorney has
no duty to present mitigation over his client's wishes, the procedure utilized in that case also suggests that counsel has an obligation to prepare mitigation even though the defendant does not
wish any such evidence to be introduced. Otherwise, the colloquy
would be an empty ritual because mitigation had not already
been prepared. Of course, since the defendant could always
change his mind about mitigation, counsel would, in any event,
have to prepare for the sentencing hearing. In Sam, the court
treated the waiver of mitigation as similar to the waiver of other
constitutional rights that must be shown to be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.2" That would require a colloquy as a matter of course in every case in which no mitigation is introduced.

217. Reid I1, 642 A.2d at 457.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. Obviously, the defense seeks in such circumstances a defense expert
rather than a neutral party.
221. 635 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2123 (1994).
222. Sam, 635 A.2d at 611.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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D. Unanimity in MitigationFindings
Mills v. Maryland"5 prohibited the requirement of unanimity in mitigation findings by a jury." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that the statutory instructions and verdict slip utilized prior to Mills did not
require such unanimity.' Because the Rules of Criminal Procedure now provide specifically for non-unanimous findings of
mitigation,"9 the court now notes such non-unanimity."
V. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
A. Notice of Aggravating Circumstances
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 352 requires notice
to the defense of any aggravating circumstances the prosecution
intends to submit at the sentencing hearing."' In two cases in
which the Commonwealth sought to file late notice of additional
circumstances, the court did not allow the filing in Commonwealth v. Antoine Williams"2 but did allow filing in Commonwealth v. Crews.'
B. Pre-TrialChallenges to the Death Penalty
It now appears that legal challenges to the availability of the
death penalty in general, and to the applicability of particular
aggravating circumstances, can be brought pre-trial. In Com-

226. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
227. Mills, 486 U.S. at 384.
228. See Stokes, 615 A.2d at 715; Peterkin, 649 A.2d at 125-26. In Peterkin, the
court also declined to apply Mills retroactively, as Mills was not "nonwaivable."
Peterkin, 649 A.2d at 126 n.4 (quoting Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 516 A.2d 1180,
1183 (Pa. 1986)).
229. See PA. R. CRiM. P. 357. Rule 357 requires the use of the jury sentencing
-verdict slip provided in Rule 358A. Id. The verdict slip in Rule 358A requires that
aggravating circumstances must be unanimously found, but allows mitigating circumstances to be found by one or more jurors. See PA. R. CRIM. P. 358A.
230. See, e.g., Thompson, 648 A.2d at 318; Peoples, 639 A.2d at 449; Daniels,
644 A.2d at 1179.
231. See note 116 for the text of Rule 352 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.
232. 650 A.2d 420, 429 (Pa. 1994).
233. 640 A.2d 395, 403-04 (Pa. 1994). See notes 115-18 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the strict construction of Rule 352 by the Antoine Williams court.
In Commonwealth v. Carter, the court seemed to apply a due process review to the
failure of the Commonwealth to give notice of an aggravating circumstance. See
Commonwealth v. Carter, 643 A.2d 61, 73-74 (Pa. 1994).
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monwealth v. Martorano, 4 the issue of the availability of the
death penalty arose in the context of a petition for bail, because
bail is not permitted in a capital case." 5 The court held that
the Commonwealth could seek the death penalty on retrial despite the imposition of a life sentence after a jury sentencing
deadlock in the prior trial."' In Commonwealth v. Gibbs,2
the defendant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to preclude the
death penalty based on alleged insufficient evidence as to three
aggravating circumstances and double jeopardy as to two circumstances. 8 The court rejected the double jeopardy argument and decided issues of statutory construction of aggravating
circumstances (d)(1) and (d)(2). 9 Although the court will not
decide "sufficiency of the evidence" issues," it will permit legal challenges to be filed pre-trial.
C. Jury Selection
Two jury selection issues arose in death penalty cases during
this period. One was the issue of "life qualification" - the assurance that potential jurors in death penalty cases are willing to
consider mitigation in arriving at a sentence. There is a federal
constitutional right to such voir dire. 4' The court in Commonwealth v. Jermyn"2 and Commonwealth v. Blount, 3 held,
however, that failure to request life qualification was not per se
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" On the other hand, as suggested in Blount, if such a request were made, it would now be
honored. 2"
The other issue that arose concerned application of Batson v.
Kentucky,' which prohibited the racially discriminatory use of

234. 634 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1993).
235. See Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1066 n.5; PA. CONST. art. I, § 14. Article 1,
section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that, la]ll prisoners shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident
or presumption great." PA. CONST. art I, § 14.
236. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1071.
237. 626 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1993).
238. Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 135.
239. Id. at 136-38. The court held that a security guard may be considered a
"peace officer" and that "transferred intent" does not apply in contract killing cases.
Id. at 137-38.
240. Id. at 137.
241. See Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2235 (1992).
242. 620 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 703 (1994).
243. 647 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1994).
244. Jermyn, 620 A.2d at 1132.33; Blount, 647 A.2d at 203-04.
245. Blount, 647 A.2d at 204.
246. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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peremptory challenges. 47 Batson challenges may fail as a prima facie matter because of the omission to make an adequate
record in the trial court during jury selection, 8 or because the
record made, though formally adequate, fails to persuasively
suggest the presence of discrimination.2 9
VI. TRiAL ISSUES
At the trial stage, a death penalty case is similar to any other
homicide prosecution. Thus, many cases involved discussions,
and sometimes reversals, on trial level issues.' There is no
reason to recount such cases here unless the trial issue involved
the death penalty in some way.
There are a number of ways in which trial issues can influence later capital sentencing. One example is the admission of
evidence at trial that the jury either is permitted to, or in any
event will, consider at sentencing. 1 Evidence of prior crimes,
for instance, will certainly influence sentencing decisions,
though there is no recognition of this in the opinions of the court
in this period. This lack of recognition is possibly because such
evidence would usually be admissible at sentencing under one or
more aggravating circumstances. In Commonwealth v.
Hawkins,"2 admission of another murder led to the reversal of
the murder conviction, whereas admissions were upheld in Sam
and Rush." Indeed, as if to illustrate the relationship between
trial and sentencing, the jury in Rush found (d)(9) during sentencing after the evidence was admitted at trial.' Another
type of evidence that could influence sentencing would be, as in
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 5 evidence tending to undermine

247. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
248. Id. at 96-97. This in fact occurred in Spence and Rush. See Spence, 627
A.2d at 1182-83; Rush, 646 A.2d at 564. Rush raised Batson in the context of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rush, 646 A.2d at 564.
249. Batson, 486 U.S. at 96-97. See Wilson, 649 A.2d at 443. In Young, the
court rejected a more detailed Batson claim. Young, 637 A.2d at 1318-19. The defendant also argued that death qualification itself violates the state constitution. Id. at
1319-20. The court summarily rejected this claim. Id.
250. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 644 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Green, 640 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 639 A.2d 9 (Pa. 1994);
Commonwealth v. Grier, 638 A.2d 965 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638
A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 626 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1993).
251. See note 121 and accompanying text.
252. 626 A.2d 550, 553 (Pa. 1993).
253. Rush, 646 A.2d at 560; Sam, 635 A.2d at 607.
254. Rush, 646 A.2d at 564.
255. 644 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1994).
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the credibility of the defendant.""6 Admission of evidence at trial may prejudice the defendant by including references to associations protected by the First Amendment, as arguably occurred
in Reid H." Such evidence can raise constitutional issues if
utilized during sentencing.2 One final trial issue that must
always arise in a death penalty case is whether the defendant is
truly guilty of the crime. Regardless whether the jury is supposed to take their confidence in the verdict into account at sentencing, there is no doubt that it is done." Thus, the decision
to admit DNA evidence in Crews, for example, may have had
consequences at sentencing.e In a related vein, the court automatically reviews the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction
in a death penalty case."' There is no special standard of review, but presumably the court is most careful in such cases.
Trial issues can also impact on sentencing when a specific
trial result subjects a defendant to the death penalty. Any issue
about such a finding may impact the sentencing. For example,
Pennsylvania cases could raise issues concerning the constitutionally requisite involvement of the defendant in the killing.
Unlike states that permit the death penalty for felony murder,
Pennsylvania requires specific intent to kill for a conviction of
first degree, and thus capital, murder."2 When an error is
made in applying the specific intent requirement, as occurred in
Commonwealth v. Huffman,2 the constitutionality of the penalty, in effect, is challenged as well.' Similarly, when an aggravating circumstance is essentially found at trial, as occurs in
the felony circumstance cases, issues of instruction and sufficiency can raise constitutional questions at sentencing.2
A third issue at death penalty trials concerns substantive
differences in the law that apply only at such trials. For exam-

256. Daniels, 644 A.2d at 1181-82.
257. Reid II, 642 A.2d at 461 (membership in "Junior Black Mafia"); cf Ragan,
645 A.2d at 820-21 (admitting evidence of a rap song composed by defendant).
258. See Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1097 (1992) (admission of evidence of membership in Aryan Brotherhood in death penalty case violated first
amendment).
259. On the admissibility of such doubts as a ground of defense sentencing
argument, see notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
260. See Crews, 640 A.2d at 399-403.
261. See, e.g., Rivers, 644 A.2d at 712 n.2.
262. See generally Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that in
order for death to be imposed in the felony murder context, the defendant must
participate in a major way in a felony resulting in death and must act with reckless
indifference to the value of human life).
263. 638 A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994).
264. See Huffman, 638 A.2d at 962.
265. See, e.g., Thompson, 648 A.2d at 319-21.
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ple, the waiver of a jury means either the empaneling of a sentencing jury or a second waiver." Presumably this must be
explained in the jury waiver colloquy, though the court did not
so state in Commonwealth v. Hughes." In Hughes the court
held that a verdict of guilty-but-mentally-ill is not permitted in a
capital case.2 The court, however, did not explain what happens if a defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment after a
sentencing hearing. Whatever a guilty-but-mentally-ill verdict
means, surely that verdict should be available to all life-sentenced individuals, whether or not the prosecution sought the
death penalty in their cases. Finally, the court held in Commonwealth v. Green 9 that the request for exculpatory discovery
submitted in almost all criminal cases' 0 requires the Commonwealth to provide all evidence "relevant and material to the
issue of punishment" including evidence of mitigation."' Given
the breadth of potential mitigation, this ruling places a substantial burden on the Commonwealth.
-VII. ISSUES AT SENTENCING
A. Procedure
A number of procedural issues at sentencing hearings were
addressed during this period. In the area of recording verdicts,
the court held in Commonwealth v. Young" that Mills v.
Maryland 3 does not require an individual verdict slip for each
juror."' In Commonwealth v. Peterkin' 5 the court held that a
trial court may impose two sentences of death when a jury returns a single verdict of death in a case involving multiple homicides.276 In the area of mitigating evidence, the court left decisions about introducing mitigation and mitigation witnesses to
the defendant, though apparently premised on the traditional
findings of knowing and intelligent waivers." In terms of aggravation, the court upheld the admission of pictures of the

266. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(b).
267. 639 A.2d 763, 772 (Pa. 1994).
268. Hughes, 639 A.2d at 773-74.
269. 640 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1994).
270. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305.
271. Green, 640 A.2d at 1246.
272. 637 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993).
273. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
274. Young, 637 A.2d at 1324.
275. 649 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1994).
276. Peterkin, 649 A.2d at 126.
277. See Birdsong, 650 A.2d at 34; Sam, 635 A.2d at 611.
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murder victim six months before her death on the theory that
the relationship between the defendant and the victim helped
demonstrate torture, and that any error was harmless." 8 The
court also allowed shackling of the defendant during the sentencing hearing, but in a context in which there was no evidence
that the shackles were visible to the jury.27
B. ProsecutionArgument and Tactics
The court tended in this period to permit vigorous argument
in favor of the death penalty by the prosecution at the close of
the sentencing hearing on the theory that prosecutors need some
rhetorical space in their presentations.' This characterization
included allowing at least some reference to future danger"1
and permitting response to defense argument. 2 Even where,
as in Commonwealth v. Meadows, 3 prosecution argument was
found to be improper, reversal of the sentence did not follow
unless trial court admonitions and cautionary instructions were
insufficient to guarantee a fair and impartial sentencing decision.' The court also allowed the prosecution flexibility in regard to cross examination at the sentencing hearing.'
C. Instructions to the Sentencing Jury
One issue that arose during this period was unanimity, or
lack of unanimity, in the finding of mitigating circumstances. In
Mills v. Maryland," the United States Supreme Court held
that there may be no requirement of unanimity in mitigation
findings. 7 Under Pennsylvania law, the court has held that

278.

Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1090; see also Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d at 1074-

75.
279. Brown, 648 A.2d at 1188.89.
280. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Griffin, 644 A.2d 1167, 1174 (Pa. 1994) (The
prosecutor "may employ 'oratorical flair' in arguing in favor of the death penalty.")
(quoting Commonwealth v. Basemore, 582 A.2d 861, 869 (Pa. 1990), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1102 (1992)); see also Reid H, 642 A.2d at 459-61; Young, 637 A.2d at 1323-24;
Jerry Marshall, 633 A.2d at 1110-11.
281. See Peoples, 639 A.2d at 451-52; Griffin, 644 A.2d at 1174-75; Kenneth
Williams, 640 A.2d at 1262.
282. See Griffin, 644 A.2d at 1174.
283. 633 A.2d 1081 (Pa. 1993).
284. Meadows, 633 A.2d at 1088-89; see also Young, 637 A.2d at 1323.
285. See, e.g., Jerry Marshall, 633 A.2d at 1109-10 (cross-examination of defendant); Young, 637 A.2d at 1322-23 (cross-examination of expert).
286. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
287. Mills, 486 U.S. at 384.
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the statute could not and never did require unanimity.' In
the one case in which there was an ambiguous trial court suggestion that non-unanimous mitigation findings were entitled to
less weight, the supreme court reversed the sentence. 9
Because jury discretion at sentencing is very broad, a judge
may not direct the jury to find a particular aggravating circumstance, even one that could hardly be contradicted on the record.' Justice Cappy asserted in a plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Stokes"' that the trial judge improperly invaded
the jury's role of applying (d)(7) by instructing that "as a matter
of logic" the circumstance was present.'
Judges do limit jury discretion, in a sense, by not instructing
on mitigating circumstances. In several cases, the court upheld
such refusals to charge. 3 One surprising case in which the
court upheld refusal to charge was Commonwealth v. Cross.'
The context in Cross was a Post Conviction Relief Act 5 action
in which the defendant alleged that appellate counsel had been
ineffective for not challenging the trial judge's failure to charge
Section 9711(c)(1)(v) to the jury."' Section 9711(c)(1)(v) provides that:
The court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion
that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to
the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment. 7

The court held that section (v) was for the information of the
judge, not the jury.' Therefore, the omission was proper and
failing to challenge it was not ineffective assistance of counsel.'

288. See, e.g., Hackett, 627 A.2d at 725; Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1262.
289. See Blount, 647 A.2d at 209-10.
290. Certainly, the judges in Jerome Marshall, Kenneth Williams, and Thompson, came close. See Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d at 1075-76; Kenneth Williams, 640
A.2d at 1262; Thompson, 648 A.2d at 326; see also Wilson, 649 A.2d at 450 (judge

did not foreclose consideration of mitigation).
291. 615 A.2d 704 (Pa. 1992).
292. Stokes, 615 A.2d at 713-14. The court affirmed the sentence of death despite this error. Id.
293. See, e.g., Young, 637 A.2d at 1322 (no instruction on mercy verdict); Riv-

ers, 644 A.2d at 719-20 (no instruction on age); cf Wilson, 649 A.2d at 452 (no sentencing instruction on reasonable doubt).

294. 634 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1993).
295.

See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-51.

296. Cross, 634 A.2d at 178.
297.
298.

42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(v).
Cross, 634 A.2d at 178.

299. Id.
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What is odd, indeed shocking, about the Cross opinion is that
section (v).is always charged to the jury in Pennsylvania death
penalty cases because, simply put, the statute says to do so.3
Section (c)(1) clearly provides that, "[blefore the jury retires to
consider the sentencing verdict, the court shall instruct the jury
on the following matters.""' Those matters are set forth in a
list of five topics, including section (v).' Perhaps there was
some reason why the plain statutory language was not followed;
however, the court in Cross failed even to mention this statutory
directive. Despite Cross, trial judges will no doubt go on reading
the five-topic list to the jury.
A different sort of instruction that may be challenged occurs
when issues that really are not present in the case are put to the
jury. In Commonwealth v. Hackett,' the court upheld the submission to the jury of the entire list of statutory aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, ruling that it did not prejudice the
defendant.'
The court in Commonwealth v. Kenneth Williams,"5 in somewhat different language, held that it was error
to submit an aggravating circumstance to the jury that was not
supported by the evidence, but that such error was harmless, if
the jury did not find the circumstance to be present.' The better practice would seem to be to limit the instruction.
An instruction issue that arose in Commonwealth v. Peoples307 involved the judge's attempt to explain the weighing process in familiar terms.s'e The judge compared it to the four- and
five-star movie rating system."e The court upheld the instruction because
the instruction as a whole did not "trivialize the pro310
cess."
Where an actual error was found in instruction, the court did
not hesitate to reverse the sentence. For example, in Commonwealth v. DeHart," the omission of an "s" in the phrase "mitigating circumstances" on the verdict slip, affected the jury's
weighing process, and therefore, caused the court to reverse the

300. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. 627 A.2d 719 (Pa. 1993).
304. Hackett, 627 A.2d at 726. The court also upheld references in the charge
to all four defendants as not suggesting a "collective verdict." Id. at 726 n.7.
305. 640 A.2d 1251 (Pa. 1994).
306. Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1263.
307. 639 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994).
308. Peoples, 639 A.2d at 450-51.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 451.
311. 650 A.2d 38 (Pa. 1994).
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sentence."'
D. Resentencing
There are two situations in which a defendant may face a
second death penalty sentencing hearing. In Commonwealth v.
Martorano13 and Commonwealth v. Gibbs,"4 the court had
15
previously reversed murder convictions, leading to new trials."
5
In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Jerome Marshall"" and Commonwealth v. Young,"1 7 the court had previously reversed sentences
of death and remanded for new sentencing hearings on18
ly

3

Both Martorano and Gibbs raised pre-trial double jeopardy
issues relating to the second sentencing hearing." 9 In
Martorano, the previous jury had deadlocked as to sentence,
thereby leading to judicial imposition of a life sentence pursuant
to Section 9711(c)(1)(v)."2 ' The defendants argued that under
the statute, jury non-unanimity was as much a verdict as was
any other jury action."2 The Martorano court, however, ruled
that a life sentence based on such deadlock was merely a "default
judgment" and therefore, death could be sought on retrial." In
Gibbs, the court held that failure to find a particular aggravating
circumstance did not bar the prosecution from seeking the same
aggravating circumstance in a new sentencing hearing." The
court in Gibbs asserted that, when death was imposed in a prior
case, in order to seek the death penalty again, the prior jury
must only have fdund one aggravating circumstance.3 2' If that
occurred, the prosecution may treat a new sentencing hearing as
a wholly new case." 5
The language of Gibbs is in some tension with the language in
Martoranobecause in the latter case, the original sentencing jury
did not find "that the presence of one or more factors weighed
312. DeHart, 650 A.2d at 48-49.
313. 634 A.2d 1063 (Pa. 1993).
314. 626 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1993).
315. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1064-65; Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 135.
316. 643 A.2d 1070 (Pa. 1994).
317. 637 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 1993).
318. Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d at 1072; Young, 637 A.2d at 1315.
319. See Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1067-68; Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 136.
320. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1064. See notes 296-302 and accompanying text for
discussion of section 9711(c)(1)v).
321. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1070.
322. Id.
323. Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 136-37.
324. Id. at 137.
325. Id. at 136-37.
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against other circumstances warranted the death penalty." "
Further, Martorano invites defense attorneys to distinguish between true deadlock and a non-unanimous verdict of life imprisonment by the sentencing jury. If the jury is not instructed as to
the consequences of true deadlock, which the court held they
need not be in Cross,27 then the jury instruction of subsection
9711(c)(1)(iv) directs the jury to return a verdict of life if they are
not unanimous for death.3 If the jury were actually to do that,
even under Martorano, the decision would presumably be final
for double jeopardy purposes.
The other resentencing issues involve new sentencing hearings
only. In both Jerome Marshall and Young, the court held that a
statutory change permitting a resentencing hearing - as opposed to imposition of a life sentence - was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to a defendant whose first sentencing hearing took place under the prior rule."' In both cases, the court held that the change was merely procedural and
violated neither the state nor the federal constitution."0
The other issues that arose in both cases concerned the
amount of evidence about the underlying murder that could be
introduced at the second sentencing hearing."m ' The court held,
in effect, that the jury at the second sentencing hearing was not
to consider only aggravation and mitigation, but also had to understand the crime for which the defendant was being sentenced.
VIII. POST-TRIAL ISSUES
This section concerns actions taken by trial judges after a
verdict of death has been returned and before the case goes to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for automatic review. Generally, after a verdict of death is returned, the trial counsel files posttrial motions and then handles the appeal. When this is done,
issues of trial counsel ineffectiveness are handled in some later
proceeding, perhaps PCRA. On the other hand, trial counsel may

326.
327.
328.

Id. at 137.
See notes 294-302 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cross.
Section 9711 (c)(1)(iv) provides:
The verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds
at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating
circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must
be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other cases.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (c)(1)(iv).
329. Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d at 1073; Young, 637 A.2d at 1316-18.
330. Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d at 1073; Young, 637 A.2d at 1318.
331. Jerome Marshall, 643 A.2d at 1073-74; Young, 637 A.2d at 1320-22..
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withdraw after the filing of post-trial motions, and another attorney will handle the appeal. In the latter instance, issues of ineffectiveness by trial counsel can then be included in an amended
post-trial motion."'
In terms of the authority of the trial judge at the post-trial
stage, Commonwealth v. Moran,"'3 in which the prosecution argued for a life sentence after extensive cooperation by the defendant, stands for the proposition that there is no general discretion to refuse to impose a sentence of death after the jury has so
found.' On the other hand, in the same case, the court implicitly endorsed the trial judge's decision to reverse (d)(9), post-trial,
on the ground that the evidence failed to support the circumstances as interpreted by the courts. 5 It thus appears that the
trial judge may review the sentence within the same parameters
as will the state Supreme Court on appeal.
In three cases, arguments for new trials on the basis of afterdiscovered evidence failed."6 The court treated these as unexceptional claims and applied a traditional standard - that is, a
standard unrelated to the death penalty. 7 The court did not
address the issue in these cases of the proper standard if afterdiscovered evidence were to be argued as the basis for a new
sentencing hearing.
IX. ISSUES ON APPEAL
A. What Kind of Appeal and Where?
Under the death penalty statute, an appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is automatic."5 The only situation in which
332. See, e.g., Thompson, 648 A.2d at 318. The court did, however, uphold the
refusal to hear pro-se post-trial motions filed by a represented defendant. Edmiston,
634 A.2d at 1092. The court called this "hybrid representation." Id.
333. 636 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2184 (1994).
334. Moran, 636 A.2d at 613-14.
335. Id. at 613 n.1.
336. See Wilson, 649 A.2d at 448-449; Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1263-64;
Moore, 633 A.2d at 1135-36.
337. The standard utilized in Kenneth Williams, for example, was taken from
Commonwealth v. Mosteller, a non-capital case:
After-discovered evidence can be the basis for a new trial if it: 1) has been
discovered after the trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to the
conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; 2) is not merely
corroborative or cumulative; 3) will not be used solely to impeach the
credibility of a witness; and 4) is of such nature and character that a different
verdict will likely result if a new trial is granted.
Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1263 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mosteller, 284 A.2d
786, 788 (Pa. 1971)).
338. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(h)(1). Section 9711(hXl) provides that, "[a]
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an appeal following a sentence of death would be heard by the
superior court is a case in which the trial court granted post-trial
relief."e On automatic appeals, the state supreme court always
engages in a four part review.' Beyond that, the court reviews
the usual run of issues that can be raised in any other appeal.34
B. What Issues Will Be Reviewed?
The court's basic approach, as stated previously, is to decide
any issues in a death penalty case that could be raised in any
other criminal case. But the court goes further, for example reviewing issues raised pro se by a defendant who is represented by
counsel. 2
The best-known illustration of the court's willingness to decide
issues in death penalty cases is the no-waiver rule. From the
beginning of the court's review of death penalty cases under the
statute, the court has reached issues on the merits that would
have been considered waived in a non-capital case.'s The court
has consistently adhered to the no-waiver policy. 4 This means
that Pennsylvania will not face the situation that other states
have faced of executing a defendant whose constitutional rights,
though waived, had clearly been violated.'

sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules." Id,
339. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douglas, 645 A.2d 226, 227 (Pa. 1994) (Following a sentence of death, the court of common pleas granted a new trial; the superior court reversed and remanded; and the supreme court affirmed.).
340. The court always determines:
1) whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the conviction
of murder of the first degree; 2) whether the sentence of death is the product
of passion prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; 3) whether the evidence
fails to support the finding of at least one specified aggravating circumstance;
and, 4) whether the sentences are excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and
the character and record of the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 327 (1994).
341. The court conducts only the minimum review in cases in which the defendant chooses to raise no issues an appeal. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. GamboaTaylor, 634 A.2d 1106, 1107 (Pa. 1993); cf Kindler, 639 A.2d at 4 (when the defendant was a fugitive during the appellate process).
342. See Commonwealth v. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d 716, 720 n.6 (Pa. 1992).
343. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d 937, 955 n.19 (Pa. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983) ("We will not adhere strictly to our normal rules of
waiver ....
Accordingly, significant issues perceived sua sponte by this Court, or
raised by the parties, will be addressed and, if possible from the record, resolved.").
344. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bills, 555 A.2d 835, 842 (Pa. 1989); Kenneth
Williams, 640 A.2d at 1261.
345. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).

1995

PA Recent Developments

-

Death Penalty Law

509

Nevertheless, issues can still be waived in death penalty cases.
Some issues can be waived because the underlying legal right
can be waived.' In such a case, there is literally no issue once
that waiver is found. Other claims may be called "waived" when
in fact the defendant simply has failed to offer proof supporting
the claim." Actually, in such situations, the claim fails on the
merits. Non-preserved claims under Batson v. Kentucky ' fail
in this way because although the court does review the challenge,
the post-hoc review on appeal generally finds a failure to make
out a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination." 9 The
no-waiver rule also arises under the PCRA. For example, in
DeHart, the court reached an issue that had been waived and
reversed the sentence of death.85
One set of issues the court seems not to reach concerns factfinder decision-making, specifically whether mitigating circumstances exist and how much weight they should be given."
Nevertheless, in two cases the court asserted that it would and
does review the weighing of aggravation and mitigation "as a
matter of law" through the statutory review mandated by Section
9711(h)(3)(i). 52 While the court will not impose its "own evalua-

346. See Wilson, 649 A.2d at 44748 (defendant made a knowing and voluntary
waiver of right to be present during penalty phase arguments). This language in
Wilson is in some tension with that in Commonwealth v. Ford, in which the court
seems to hold that a defendant could not waive his right to be present because he
was obligated to be present. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 650 A.2d 433, 440 (Pa.
1994). The court hedged this holding by suggesting that the defendant was not prejudiced by the requirement that he attend. See Ford, 650 A.2d at 440 n.6.
347. See, e.g., Ford, 650 A.2d at 440 (no proof of interference with jury deliberation, therefore issue was "waived").
348. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (standard for purposeful discrimination in the case of
peremptory challenges).
349. See, e.g., Wilson, 649 A.2d at 442; Spence, 627 A.2d at 1182-83.
350. See DeHart, 650 A.2d at 48 (noting that the verdict slip issue was "technically waived" but would be decided "because we have not been strict in applying our
waiver rules in death penalty cases"); cf Peterkin, 649 A.2d at 125 (approving of a
stricter PCRA standard, but nevertheless, reaching all issues on the merits).
351. See, e.g., Gamboa.Taylor, 634 A.2d at 1109. In Gamboa-Taylor the court
noted that, "[als to Valerie's death, the court found that these two mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the one aggravating circumstance, and since sufficient
evidence supports the aggravating circumstance found, there is no basis upon which
we can reverse the court's conclusion as to the penalty." Id.; cf Rivers, 644 A.2d at
719 (asserting that only the jury can decide whether criminal history was "signifi.
cant").
352. See Brown, 648 A.2d at 1188. In Brown, the court contended:
While this court does not perform a weight-of-evidence analysis of the
jury's balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it nevertheless
reviews the sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(i), which requires
review for "passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.* This is tantamount to reviewing the fairness of the jury's evaluation of the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances "as a matter of law."
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tion" of the evidence, it will reverse a sentence that is irrational.353 An example of this sort of review may be found in Commonwealth v. Rush,' in which the court responded to the
defendant's challenge of the no-mitigation finding by pointing to
the inadequacy of the defense's evidence."' Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Hughes,356 the court held that the trial judge
sitting as fact-finder did not err in failing to find (e)(3). 7
C. Standards of Reversal in Death Penalty Cases
In reviewing alleged errors in the finding of aggravating circumstances, the court did not reverse, despite such error, if another aggravating circumstance was present and no mitigation
was found." 8 The court also did not reverse if error did not lead
to a finding of aggravation."5 On the other hand, if there was
error in the finding of one of multiple aggravating circumstances,
and mitigation was present, reversal of the sentence was automatic.6 There is no re-weighing of the sentencing evidence.
The other standards utilized by the court in death penalty
review are the usual ones in criminal cases or are adaptations of
statutory review provisions. For example, the harmless error
standard the court uses renders error harmless only when "it is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict." 6'

Id.
353. See Thompson, 648 A.2d at 321.
354. 646 A.2d 557 (Pa. 1994).
355. Rush, 646 A.2d at 564.
356. 639 A.2d 763 (Pa. 1994).
357. Hughes, 639 A.2d at 774.
358. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 650 A.2d 863, 866 (Pa. 1994); Stokes,
615 A.2d at 714. Death is mandated in such a case, despite the error. See 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv).
359. See Kenneth Williams, 640 A.2d at 1263 (harmless error to submit torture
aggravating circumstance because circumstance not found).
360. See Antoine Williams, 650 A.2d at 430.
361. Edmiston, 634 A.2d at 1090; see also Young, 637 A.2d at 1323 (Improper
prosecution sentencing argument not ground for reversal unless the "unavoidable effect was to prejudice the jury so that it was unable to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict."); Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 617 A.2d 1263, 1268
(Pa. 1992) (For death sentences to be reversed, erroneous sentencing instruction
must "inject 'passion, prejudice or some other arbitrary factor' into jury deliberation."); accord Daniels, 644 A.2d at 1184.

1995

PA Recent Developments -

Death Penalty Law

511

D. ProportionalityReview
The death penalty statute prescribes proportionality review in
every death penalty case. 2 In fulfillment of this obligation, the
court in 1984 ordered the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania
Courts to begin compiling information about first degree murder
cases in Pennsylvania.'"
By and large, it is impossible to tell what sort of review the
court conducts pursuant to Section 9711 (h)(3)(iii). The language
the court utilizes in the opinions to describe the process conveys
no information at all, beyond the assertion that a review was
carried out."' Obviously if the opinions simply repeat this, it
does not matter if, as in Jerry Marshall, there was no reference
to the "study" that set forth the universe of comparison.'
In part, the perfunctory quality of proportionality review may
be premised on the view that when no mitigation is found, and
death is mandated by law on the finding of one valid aggravating
circumstance, death is by definition proportional and non-excessive. At least the court suggested this in Commonwealth v. Craig
Williams,"' when it asserte4:
In addition, upon our review of the data and information compiled and
monitored by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, we find
no excess or disproportionality when compared to the sentences imposed
in similar cases. We emphasize that the statute requires a verdict of
death in those instances where the jury finds at least one aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, 42 Pa.C.S. §9711(c)(1)(iv).
Therefore, all similarly situated defendants receive the same sentence,
and thus, the death penalty cannot be considered excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in cases involving these circumstances.
Furthermore, upon consideration of the manner in which appellant com-

362. Section 9711(h)(3)(iii) provides that, "[t]he Supreme Court shall affirm the
sentence of death unless it determines that . . . (iii) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant." 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9711(h)(3)(iii).
363. See Commonwealth v. Frey, 475 A.2d 700, 707-08 (Pa.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 963 (1984).
364. See, e.g., Hackett, 627 A.2d at 727. In Hackett, the court noted:
We now comply with our duty under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(iii) to
review sentences of death from the standpoint of the proportionality to sentences imposed in similar cases. We have reviewed the sentences imposed on
Hackett in light of sentencing data compiled and monitored by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts. We perceive no excess or disproportionality
in the sentences imposed.
Id. (citations omitted).
365. Jerry Marshall, 633 A.2d at 1111 (simply "similar cases").
366. 615 A.2d 716 (Pa. 1992).
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mitted this homicide, together with his character and record, we find no

basis upon which to conclude that his sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases."

But even if no review is needed in no-mitigation cases, that
does not explain a perfunctory approach to proportionality review
in a case like Commonwealth v. Conforti,' in which the jury

found that the single aggravating circumstance of murder during
the commission of a felony outweighed substantial mitigation of
no prior record, physical disability and "mental state."' If the

point of proportionality review is to avoid imposing the death
penalty when more egregious cases receive life terms, then surely
the proportionality of Michael Conforti's sentence was sufficiently
in doubt to warrant some specific detail as to what cases his was
compared to.
For that matter, even in Craig Williams, when no mitigation

was found, the court, in fact, did say more about its review. 70
More thorough analysis should be required in such cases. For one

367. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d at 728. Of course, if the Justices really thought
that the matter was automatic, why was the last sentence added?
368. 626 A.2d 129 (Pa. 1993). The court in Conforti asserted:
At the penalty hearing, the jury sentenced appellant to death, based upon its
finding that the one aggravating circumstance, that the defendant committed
the killing while in the perpetration of a felony (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(6))
outweighed the two mitigating circumstances, that the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(1)) and the
defendant's physical disability and mental state at the time of the crime (42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(8)). In accordance with our statutorily mandated review,
we find that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the finding of at least one
aggravating circumstance, since the killing occurred during the commission of
five felonies, i.e. kidnapping, rape, and conspiracy to commit the crimes of
murder, kidnapping, and rape.
The record also supports our conclusion that the sentence of death is a
product of the evidence and not a product of "passion, prejudice or any other
factor." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3). Additionally, based upon information accumulated by the Pennsylvania Death Penalty Study and supplied by the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, we conclude that the circumstances
of the crime and the record of the appellant justify the sentence of death and
that the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.
Conforti, 626 A.2d at 132.
369. Id.
370. See Craig Williams, 615 A.2d at 727. The court asserted:
Appellant argues that the death sentence is excessive in this case
because he did not intend to kill Gordon Russell and was convicted of murder
of the first degree based upon "transferred intent." This position is ludicrous.
The jury found that Appellant did intend to kill and did kill, and he has no
basis to compare himself with those who did not. One who intentionally kills,
but whose fatal blow fall on a mistaken victim, is if anything more culpable
than murders who do not carelessly kill innocent bystanders.
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thing, juries do not always return sentences of death when the
statute mandates it, as the court acknowledged in Reid V.71 For
another, there can be more to a case than a simple "no-mitiga-

tion" finding suggests, as Craig Williams shows.
The uncontradicted evidence in Craig Williams was that two
days before the killing, Erica Riggens had severely knifed
Williams's girlfriend, who was seven months pregnant.37 The
murder victim, Gordon Russell, had the misfortune to walk into
the line of fire two days later, when Williams found Erica

Riggens and shot at her. 73 The only aggravating circumstance
found was grave risk of death to another.3 ""

While Williams was obviously guilty of first degree murder, the
court's conclusion that transferred intent did not render the sentence disproportional ignored the underlying issue of "similar
case" review.7 5 Even without a study, one can say that the cir-

cumstances of many first degree murder cases in Pennsylvania
are far worse than the circumstances in Craig Williams, and
clearly more culpable defendants have been before the court. The
court should have openly reviewed similar cases - and more

egregious ones - to determine whether those other defendants
routinely received life sentences.
The problem may be that the Justices are not prepared to
expose to public discussion the decision-making process they are
using. Perhaps it is not clear to the Justices what proportionality

review requires of them. To date, they have not reversed a sentence of death under the statute on the basis of proportionality
review."'

371. Reid 1, 626 A.2d at 123 (In a case of no mitigation, "[o]ur review indicates
that the death penalty has been imposed.in a substantial number of such cases.").
372. Craig Williams, 615 A.2d at 720.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 728. See note 65 for the text of section 9711(d)(7) providing for risk
of death to another as an aggravating circumstance.
375. Id. at 727-28.
376. In two cases, the court did address proportionality in more substantive
terms. In Young, the court rejected claims that the proper database for purposes of
comparison was the county in which the murder occurred and that the trial judge
should have conducted that review. Young, 637 A.2d at 1331. In Hughes, the defendant actually attached a comparison case to his brief. Hughes, 639 A.2d at 775. The
court took pains to distinguish that life-sentenced case from Hughes. Id. The court's
care suggests that defense counsel should work harder to present specific cases to
the court for proportionality comparison.
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X. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are raised in almost
every death penalty case. But under that general heading, such
claims actually raise two different types of issues.
One set of ineffectiveness challenges represents a way of raising claims that have not been properly preserved below. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Blount, 7' the court reversed the
sentence of death because the defendant received ineffective
assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase." 8 In reality, however, ineffectiveness was merely a "guise 1 79 for challenging the
trial court's sentencing instruction, to which trial counsel should
have, but did not, object. Thus, the real issue was simply whether there was prejudicial error at the sentencing." ° The same
sort of ineffectiveness challenge was raised concerning a failure
to request guilt phase instruction in Commonwealth v.
Chmiel." 1
Given the no-waiver rule, 2 it is not clear whether this sort
of ineffectiveness claim is really needed. It would appear that the
court would reach a challenge like the one raised in Blount simply on the merits, even though trial counsel had failed to object
to the instruction at the sentencing.' In any event, these sorts
of ineffectiveness claims are best understood as challenges on the
merits.' "

377. 647 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1994).
378. Blount, 647 A.2d at 209-10.
379. Id. at 208-09.
380. See also Brown, 648 A.2d at 1185 (no ineffectiveness for failure to object
to the method of proving (d)(12) because the method was proper).
It is not that the court in Blount did not cite an ineffectiveness standard, for
it did do so. See Blount, 647 A.2d at 203. The court noted:
In order for appellant to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness, he must
demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course chosen by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to
effectuate his interests; and (3) counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced him.
Counsel can never be found ineffective for having elected not to raise a
meritless claim. Moreover, we begin with the presumption that trial counsel
was not ineffective.
Id. (citations omitted). Rather, the court simply did not consider anything other than
the merits of the underlying claim. Id. at 209-10.
381. 639 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. 1994) (failure to give an accomplice instruction was
reversible error).
382. See notes 343-45 and accompanying text for discussion of the no-waiver
rule.
383. Ineffectiveness claims can only be raised on appeal if the defendant is not
represented by trial counsel. See Birdsong, 650 A.2d at 30. If trial counsel could
raise these same issues on appeal through the no-waiver rule, no substitution of
counsel would be necessary.
384. In Chmiel, the court applied ineffectiveness analysis, but it is not certain
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The other major form of ineffectiveness claim, and one which
truly does go to the competence of counsel, concerns counsel's
conduct at the trial and sentencing. Perhaps the best example of
this sort of claim was Commonwealth v. Perry, 5 in which the
court found that counsel had woefully failed to prepare either for
the trial or for the sentencing and that he had not even been
aware on the eve of trial that his client was facing the death
penalty.'" The court remanded for a new trial."
The court examines this sort of ineffectiveness challenge on a
case by case basis. Even the failure to present any specific mitigation evidence was held not to be ineffective per se.' The defendant must be able to specify what mitigating evidence should
have been offered. 9 In judging ineffectiveness claims that go to
conduct of the trial and sentencing, the court gives deference to
"any reasonable basis" that counsel may proffer. 3" The defendant must also show prejudice."el
Other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have also been
rejected. In several cases, the defendant argued that counsel had
been ineffective for following the defendant's instructions.'
The court rejected these claims.393
A claim related to ineffectiveness was raised in Commonwealth
v. Carter,94 in which the defendant argued that he was entitled
to two attorneys in a death penalty case. 9 ' The court rejected
the claim, in part because of a failure to show prejudice.'" Fiwhat the court would have done if the issue had been raised directly by trial counsel on appeal. See Chmiel, 639 A.2d at 12-14. Of course, in non-death penalty cases
such claims would be waived because of the failure to request the instruction.
385. 644 A.2d 705 (Pa. 1994).
386. Perry, 644 A.2d at 707-08.
387. Id. at 709. The court held that failure to prepare cannot be a tactical
choice. Id. ("It is not possible to provide a reasonable justification for appearing in
front of a death penalty jury without thorough preparation.*).
388. See Moore, 633 A.2d at 1134-35.
389. Id.; see also Wilson, 649 A.2d at 449.
390. See Douglas, 645 A.2d at 229-32 (alteration in original) (reasonable basis
for questioning that alerted jury to defendant's criminal record).
391. See, e.g., Wilson, 649 A.2d at 450 (refusing to find ineffectiveness because
it was "highly unlikely that jury would have found" mitigating circumstance defendant claims counsel should have presented).
392. See, e.g., Rush, 646 A.2d at 563 (asserting no ineffectiveness for eliciting
testimony per client's instructions); Pierce, 645 A.2d at 195 (finding no ineffectiveness
for failing to override client's decision on records); Cross, 634 A.2d at 175-76 (holding
no ineffectiveness for failure to present evidence of insanity when client maintained
innocence).
393. See, e.g., Rush, 646 A.2d at 563; Pierce, 645 A.2d at 195; Cross, 634 A.2d
at 176.
394. 643 A.2d 61 (Pa. 1994).
395. Carter, 643 A.2d at 73.
396. Id. Perhaps the court would be more amenable to this argument on a
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nally, ineffectiveness claims are raised routinely in PCRA cases.
These will be discussed below.
XI. POST CONVICTION ISSUES

The Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act"9 is a highly
specialized mode of relief for persons whose convictions have already been affirmed. The first question about the PCRA is
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which hears capital
PCRA appeals," 8 applies PCRA law as it would apply in any
non-capital case, or whether the court takes account of the capital nature of the case, as it does on direct appeal.
There are indications that the court takes the death penalty
into account. In Commonwealth v. Maxwell," for example, Justice Larsen's plurality opinion stated that the challenge to the
use of a certain New York conviction to prove (d)(9) was not cognizable because it had been previously litigated.' But Justice
Larsen then added in a footnote that, "[elven assuming that
appellee's claim is cognizable for the purpose of this appeal (and
we make the assumption only because this is a death penalty
case), [the claim is without merit].""' The court also reached
the merits of a claim of ineffectiveness in Commonwealth v. Griffin,"2 after stating that the ineffectiveness was not cognizable
because of the defendant's prior self-representation and that the
court would not treat the case differently just because it was a
death penalty case.' The court then immediately added that,
"[in light of the severity of appellant's sentence, however, we will
discuss the merits of Appellant's claims of ineffectiveness of counsel."' On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Peterkin,'
the court applied both the previously litigated and waiver standards, although it is not clear that any issues were actually
avoided." 6
While no absolute rule can be deduced from such an array, it is
clear that the court hesitates to send someone to death because

different
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
that the
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

record.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-51 (1982 & Supp. 1994).
See DeHart, 650 A.2d at 42 n.5; Griffin, 644 A.2d at 1169.
626 A.2d 499 (Pa. 1993).
Maxwell, 626 A.2d at 501; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543(a)(3).
Maxwell, 626 A.2d at 501 n.4; see also Jermyn, 620 A.2d at 1133 (holding
issue had been previously litigated and was without merit).
644 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1994).
Griffin, 644 A.2d at 1171.

Id.
649 A.2d 121 (Pa. 1994).
See Peterkin, 649 A.2d at 123-25.
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of a failure to comply with procedural and timing rules. If issues
are without merit, the court prefers to deny relief directly.
The best illustration of reaching the merits is Commonwealth
v. DeHart,4°7 the one PCRA case in which relief was
granted."°s In DeHart, the court reversed because of an error in
the sentencing verdict slip.' The court began its discussion by
acknowledging the procedural bar."" The court asserted:
Although Appellant concedes that this issue is technically waived because it was not previously raised below, we will nonetheless address it
because we have not been strict in applying our waiver rules in death
penalty cases. See Commonwealth v. Billa, 521 Pa. 168, 181, 555 A.2d
835, 842 (1989).4"

Not only does this language show that the court will reach meritorious issues in death penalty cases despite the limitations of
PCRA, but the reference to Commonwealth v. Billa, a direct appeal case, suggests that the court will be as ready to do so in
PCRA actions as it is on direct appeal.
In contrast to this willingness to reach arguably barred issues,
the court did rely on non-retroactivity to affirm a death sentence
in another PCRA case, Commonwealth v. Fahy."' In Fahy, the
court held that the law had "changed" in 1987 as to requirements
for instruction on torture and that Fahy would not be granted
relief because his trial had occurred before the change was
announced.413
In terms of the substantive standards under PCRA, the opinions tend to treat ineffectiveness in much the same way as on
direct appeal and with similar results. In Commonwealth v.
Cross,414 for example, the defendant claimed ineffectiveness for

failure to object at the trial and the failure to raise on appeal two
sentencing instruction issues."5 The court resolved these issues
by holding that there had been no error as a matter of substantive death penalty law. 18
In Commonwealth v. Jermyn,"7 the defendant challenged tri-

407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

650 A.2d 38 (Pa. 1994).
See DeHart, 650 A.2d at 49.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 48.

412. 645 A.2d 199 (Pa. 1994).
413. Fahy, 645 A.2d at 201 n.8.
414. 634 A.2d 173 (Pa. 1993).
415. Cross, 634 A.2d at 178.
416. Id.; see also Peterkin, 649 A.2d at 125 (no prejudicial error in prosecution
argument).
417. 620 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 703 (1994).
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al counsel's conduct of the sentencing hearing. 48 The court held
that counsel's failure to fully cooperate with the defendant had
been consistent with the attorney's ethical obligations.'19
The court's treatment of successor PCRA petitions acknowledged the strict statutory standards for such petitions. In Commonwealth v. Szuchon,20 the court set forth the standard as
follows:
Finally, our cases require that a second or subsequent petition for
post-conviction relief will not be entertained "unless a strong prima facie
showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage ofjustice may have
occurred."
This standard is met if the petitioner can demonstrate either: (a) that
the proceedings resulting in his conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage ofjustice occurred which no civilized society can tolerate, or (b) that
he is innocent of crimes charged.'

On the other hand, the court showed flexibility even here. In
Szuchon itself, for example, the opinion strongly suggested that
the issues raised were without merit."' In Griffin, the court
treated what was "[als a technical matter" a successor petition as
if it were the defendant's first post-conviction petition, in part
because of "the severity of Appellant's sentence."'
One issue the court did not rule on expressly is the proper
standard for a stay of execution under PCRA. In Griffin, a stay of
execution was issued "pending disposition of [the] PCRA petition." 24 The court did not express any view about the propriety
of the stay in its opinion. In Fahy, the court recited its grant of a
stay of execution upon the filing of a Petition for Stay of Execution and Appointment of Counsel, but the court again did not
state whether such stays were automatic upon the filing of a
PCRA petition or whether some standard of review should be
applied. 25

418. Jermyny, 620 A.2d at 1130-31.
419. Id. at 1131; see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 650 A.2d 863, 866-67 (Pa.
1994) (counsel's failure to present mitigation reasonable).
420. 633 A.2d 1098 (Pa. 1993).
421. Szuchon, 633 A.2d at 1099-100 (citations omitted).
422. Id. at 1099.
423. Griffin, 644 A.2d at 1170. The court also noted that the "mere assertion of
ineffective assistance of counsel" would not be sufficient for relief in a successor petition; rather, there must be a showing of a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 1170 n.2
(citing Commonwealth v. Lawson, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (Pa. 1988)).
424. Griffin, 644 A.2d at 1169.
425. See Fahy, 645 A.2d at 201.
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XII. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR
The death penalty statute provides that upon affirmance of a
death penalty by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "the
prothonotary of the Supreme Court shall transmit to the Governor a full and complete record [of the case]. " " Pennsylvania
law further provides that upon the receipt of the record, the governor "shall issue a warrant."427 No execution can be carried out
without a warrant from the governor. 2 s
In Morganelli v. Casey,' 9 the district attorney of Northamp-

ton County sued in Commonwealth Court for a writ of mandamus directing Governor Casey to sign warrants for two deathsentenced individuals.' 0 The court granted this relief."1
Obviously, the Morganelli litigation raises important issues of
separation-of-powers. One would have expected a number of
district attorneys, frustrated over the pace of warrant signings, to
file similar suits, until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finally
resolved the issues of the governor's power and discretion.
That may not happen, however. With the election of Governor

Tom Ridge, the warrant situation is changing. Governor Ridge
said repeatedly during the election campaign, and has repeated

since then, that the warrant process should be expedited. 2 It
may be that Morganelli will be rendered moot by changes in the
law and/or in procedures in the Governor's office."

426. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(h)(3Xiii).
427. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2123 (1964) ("After the receipt of the said record
the Governor of the Commonwealth shall issue a warrant, directed to the Secretary
of Corrections, commanding that such inmate be executed within the week to be
named in said warrant, and in the manner prescribed by law.").
428. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 2123.
429. 641 A.2d 674 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
430. Morganelli, 641 A.2d at 676-77.
431. Id. at 679.
432. See Execution Opponents Fear Ridge, DAILY NEWS (McKeesport, Pa.), January 16, 1995, at 1.
433. On Monday, February 26, 1995, Governor Ridge ordered the mandamus
appeal in the Morganelli case to be dropped and signed warrants in the two cases
at issue. See PI'rSBURGH POST-GAz=TrE, March 6, 1995, at B2. The scope of review
of death penalty cases in federal habeas corpus is beyond the scope of this article.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988). Such review applies to federal claims only and in theory will be applied in the same way in every state. Of course, federal review does depend upon state procedural and substantive law. For example, the issue of procedural default will be influenced to a great extent by Pennsylvania's no-waiver rule. Cf
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Ultimately, however, federal standards
will govern.
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XIII. EPILOGUE
During the period when this article was being readied for publication, events involving the death penalty continued to unfold.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided four cases relating to
the death penalty, three affirmances on direct appeal and one
denial of a stay of execution, and newly elected Governor Tom
Ridge signed three warrants of execution, that of Martin Appell
for the week of April 2, 1995; that of Joseph Henry for the week
of April 16, 1995; and that of Keith Zettlemoyer for the week of
April 30, 1995.'"
In terms of the cases, the court affirmed the sentence of death
in Commonwealth v. Rompilla,"' Commonwealth v. Bond'
and Commonwealth v. Jones."7 The cases do not break new
ground. All three indicate problems in representation. In
Rompilla, the defendant attempted unsuccessfully to supplement
motions and briefs.' s In Bond, the defense raised no sentencing
issues on appeal. In Jornes, appellate counsel was at least the
defendant's fifth attorney." 9 The Supreme Court had previously
remanded the case after submission of briefs without argument
for the appointment of new counsel because "the efforts of
appellant's [prior] counsel [were] less than adequate."' The
defendant challenged the failure of trial counsel to present character witnesses or investigate for sentencing purposes, but made
no showing on appeal of what should have been done nor what it
would have produced." 1
The court in Rompilla affirmed a finding of aggravating circumstance (d)(8), torture, upon direct, expert evidence that the
wounds were inflicted with the intent to cause pain."2 The emphasis upon this evidence may suggest that multiple stab wounds
by themselves do not establish torture. The court also reiterated
that burglary is not admissible under (d)(9), history of violent
felony convictions, unless there is a showing at sentencing, which
there was in Rompilla that in the course of a prior burglary the
defendant had used or threatened violence." 3

434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.

See PITSBURGH POST-GAZEIrE, March 6, 1995, at B2.
No. 53 Capital Appeal Docket, 1995 Pa. LEXIS 71 (January 23, 1995).
652 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1995).
651 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 1994).
See Rompilla, 1995 Pa. LEXIS 71, at *2 n.8.
See Jones, 651 A.2d at 1104 n.1.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 604 A.2d 1020, 1020 (Pa. 1993).
Jones, 651 A.2d at 1109.
Rompilla, 1995 Pa. LEXIS 71, at *20.
Id. at *21.
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In Commonwealth v. Jermyn,' the court affirmed the denial
of a stay of execution.' The case was unusual because the
court previously had denied PCRA relief.' The stay request
was not treated as a successor petition, however. Instead, the
application for a stay, which apparently was premised exclusively
on grounds of mental incompetence to be executed, 447 was treated as an independent action. Competency for execution may thus
be an issue separate from PCRA litigation.
On the merits, the court concluded that the trial judge had
applied the proper standard in judging competency - whether
the defendant's mental 'illness "now prevents him from comprehending the reasons for the death penalty or its implications."' The court also held that the mental competency standard of the Mental Health Procedures Act' 9 does not govern
proceedings at the execution stage."

652 A.2d 821 (Pa. 1995).
Jermyn, 652 A.2d at 824.
See Jermyn, 652 A.2d at 822.
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 823.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (Supp. 1994).
Jermyn, 652 A.2d at 823.

